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Prosecutions For Attempts To Evade Income Tax:
A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid*
Steven Duket
Legal proscriptions have proliferated at a Parkinsonian rate during
the twentieth century, along with the officials who enforce them.'
Administrative agencies have assumed much of the prosecutor's pre-
rogative of selecting targets for sanctions. Courts and juries, along
with the prosecutor, have surrendered discretion to the agencies, as
fact finding, law application, and law determination have all become
part of the administrative process.2
Administrative expertise supposedly justifies this radical redistribu-
tion of power. Efficient use of enforcement resources, skillful selection
of sanctions, and deft location of areas of noncompliance are all advan-
tages claimed for deference to the administrator. To the ardent pro-
ponent of administrative discretion, judicial review seems a senseless
interference with bureaucratic routine, or at best a superfluous ratifica-
tion.
The Supreme Court has been the bellwether in this process of
transferring competence from court to administrator where the sanc-
tion is a civil one.3 Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress, however,
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[.] See PouND, CRihINAL JusrncE N Atmuc& 23 (1930); Ai.xN, Tim BorMEPLAN oF
Cnram a. JusTIcE 3 (1964).
[2.] See GELLHoRN, IlNIVIDUAL FEEo.MW AND GovmramrrAL RmN.msirs 3.23 (1956);
McKay, Sanctions in Motion, The Administrative Process, 49 IowA L. Rtv. 441 (1964).
[3.] See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); O'Leary v.
Brown-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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has been willing explicitly to advance the same arguments in justifica-
tion of a reallocation of authority where the sanction is "criminal."
Indeed, recent trends in the criminal process have been in the opposite
direction-making judge and jury more effective checks on the power
of police and prosecutor. Yet the extent to which the Supreme Court
has rejected the values of administrative deference in the criminal
process can easily be exaggerated.4 There are still substantial segments
of the process which have barely been touched by the Court's epochal
decisions.5 In areas where there is no capital punishment, where the
typical target has at least average intellectual and financial resources,
and where the investigative officials are narrowly specialized and
obviously expert-where, in short, the only major difference from the
typical agency decision to invoke a sanction is that the sanction is
criminal, the Court has seemed singularly unconcerned about preserv-
ing the trial as a potent vehicle of administrative control. The clearest
example of this is the tax evasion prosecution.0
Trends in tax prosecution have for at least two decades been con-
tinuously running against the main currents in criminal procedure. By
subtle doctrinal manipulation, the courts confer more and more dis-
[4.] At least until very recently, some 80 to 90 percent of cases in which the criminal
process was invoked ended in guilty or nolo pleas. See 1964 DiREorop oF Tim ADMINIS-
TRATivE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTs ANN. REP. 256. In the typical criminal
case, therefore, there is no judicial determination of guilt in any real sense; these de-
cisions are made by police and prosecutors. This condition is due to the willingness of
courts to permit interrogation of suspects incommunicado, the reluctance or inability
of courts to provide competent defense counsel, the alacrity with which all but a few
judges reward guilty pleas with comparatively light sentences (see Note, 112 U. PA. L. Rv.
865 (1964); Comment, 66 YA.E L.J. 204 (1956)), and to subtle shifts in the procedures
of the trial itself which make it more difficult for the accused to avoid conviction (see
Goldstein, The State and The Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). Some of these conditions are rapidly being changed. For an
unusually perceptive analysis of current trends, see Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
[5.] Several of the Supreme Court's epochal decisions in the criminal process have
involved defendant's under death sentences, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
New standards have also frequently been set in cases involving particular criminal sanc-
tions whose efficacy and justness are most dubious, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964) (narcotics), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (gambling), Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (illegal liquor transactions)). In virtually all other
cases in which the police have been curbed, the accused has been inordinately poor and
ignorant, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). Of course the Supreme Court speaks in these cases in terms of broad principles
seemingly applicable to all areas of the criminal process, but what seems so often isn't.
[6.] Other less pervasive examples are antitrust and securities regulation. See Com-
ment, Discovery In Criminal Antitrust Cases, 64 COLUA. L. REv. 755 (1964); Bork, A
General Appraisal, 1963 N.Y.S.B.A. ANT1TRUST LAw Symrosium 111 (1963); Spiegel, The
Antitrust Civil Process Act: The Attorney-General's Pre-action Key to Company Files,
10 ViLL. L. Rev. 413 (1965); Ruck 8: Youngquist, Commingled Civil and Criminal Pro.
ceedings: A Peek at Constitutional Limitations and a Poke at the SEC, 34 GEo. Wasi.
L. REv. 527 (1966).
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cretion on invoking officials and reduce the roles of judge and jury. The
judge's role is limited by his abdication of responsibility to define the
offense and to determine the sufficiency of evidence. The jury's function
is restricted by a procedural panoply which prevents a full and fair
test of the Government's proofs.
The main support for a different course of doctrinal development
in tax prosecutions than in criminal procedure generally is the fact
that civil and criminal sanctions apply to the same conduct and are
invoked by the same officials. Tax agents act in a dual capacity,
making their investigations ambiguous and creating powerful pressures
for self-incrimination. Courts frequently confer procedural advantages
upon the Government, and deny them to the accused, by labelling the
problem as one of "civil" or "criminal" procedure, as the context
requires. A tax prosecution is a procedural hybrid.
I. The Definition of the Offense
Vagueness of definition, a standard source of administrative dis-
cretion,7 is a significant feature of criminal tax sanctions." Section 7201
of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes infliction of five years in
prison, a $10,000 fine and costs of prosecution upon "any person who
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax... or the
payment thereof."9 Courts agree that there can be no conviction under
this statute unless the defendant failed to pay all the income tax that
was due.10 It is not enough that the taxpayer made false entries in
his return and thought he was cheating; his efforts must actually have
produced a deficiency. Many courts go further and require that the
deficiency be "substantial,"" though underpayment of a few hundred
dollars has been held sufficient.'-
[7.] See generally, Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentendng
Process, 75 HA.v. L. Rxv. 904 (1962); Remington and Rosenblum, The Criminal Law
and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL L. Fon 481 (1960).
[8.] Vagueness may also enhance the deterrent effect of a sanction in that uncertainty
may scare away many who otherwise would press dose to the line of legality. But see
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YAMI .J. 405, 443-447 (1959).
[9.] Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall . ..be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both, together with costs of prosecution.
INT. REV. COD oF 1954, § 7201 [herein after cited as I.R.C.].
[10.] Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339, 361 (1958); Wilingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 828 (1961); BALT.R, TAx FRAUD AND EvAstoN § 11.4-5 (3d ed. 1963).
[11.] See, e.g., Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 912 (1957).
[12.] Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960), rVd on other grounds, 366
U.S. 716 (1961).
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Besides having underpaid his taxes, the defendant must have engaged
in some affirmative act, the "likely effect of which would be to mislead
or conceal."' 3 The usual affirmative act of attempted tax evasion is the
filing of a false income tax return. 4 A taxpayer may be convicted bf
attempting to evade payment of taxes even though he filed no return,
however, or even if he filed a correct return but failed to pay his full tax,
if there is evidence of some act of deception such as a false statement
to revenue agents,'" willful falsification or destruction of books and
records, or any other act of concealment or subterfuge.' 0
The affirmative act is an offense if accompanied by "willfulness." This
means, first, that at the time of the act the taxpayer knew he had a tax
deficiency. His knowledge of the tax law and of the contents of his
return are therefore elements of willfulness."' Second, the affirmative act
must have been motivated, at least in part, by a desire to defeat the
Government in its efforts to collect the tax deficiency.18 Third, the state
of mind accompanying the act must have included a "bad purpose" or
"evil motive."'19
With an Internal Revenue Code of more than half a million words
strung together in sentences and clauses of unsurpassed complexity,
supported by policies often both vague and contradictory, it is not
unusual for a taxpayer to have an honest doubt about the treatment
of a particular item-whether it is ordinary income or capital gain,
exempt or taxable, subject to special credits and allowances, deductible
in full or in part, a business expense or a personal one. Thus whether or
not the taxpayer was aware of the falsity of his return is often, poten-
tially at least, an issue of consequence, apart from the question of
whether there was a deficiency. The proper tax treatment will some-
times be sufficiently uncertain to justify letting the jury determine not
only what the defendant thought was the tax law governing a particular
[13.] Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
[14.] Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373, 377 (1957); United States v. Raub, 177
F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1949).
[15.) United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
[16.] Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962):
United States v. Mollet, 290 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Schlipani, 362 F.2d
825, 831 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3166 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1966).
[17.] See, James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (opinion of Warren, C.J.); Wardlaw
v. United States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670
(3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953); Lurding v. United States, 179 F.2d 419
(6th Cir. 1950); Haigler v. United States, 172 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1949).
(18.1 Spies v. United States, supra note 13.
[19.) Spies v. United States, supra note 13 ("evil motive and want of justification');
Armstrong v. United States, 327 F.2d 189, 196 (9th Cir. 1964) ("bad faith and evil motive");
Ballantyne v. United States, 293 F.2d 112, 116 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 869 U,S, 802 (1962)
("bad and evil purpose").
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item, but what it really was. For example, if an increase in wealth is
claimed to have been an exempt gift, the question of taxability is
"basically one of fact" to be decided by the jury drawing upon its
"experience with the wellsprings of human conduct."20 Herein lies a
quagmire.
Whether the taxpayer is aware at the time he files the return of the
proper tax treatment of an item will always be a matter of degree. He
may be virtually certain that his handling of an item in the return is
legally false, may appraise the probabilities of falsity at about 50-50,
or may think there is little likelihood that an omitted item is income or
a deducted item is non-deductible. The courts have not even suggested
what degree of awareness constitutes "willfulness."
The question is further clouded by uncertainty as to what the tax-
payer must have been rather sure of in order for him to have known his
return was false. He is charged with making a prediction of his own
obligations and failing to comply with the obligations as he perceived
them. The prediction is apparently of hypothetical attitudes of decision-
makers: what they would decide about the item if they knew about it.
But who are the relevant decision-makers? Is a taxpayer's return will-
fully false if he omits as income an item which he believes the local
agents would regard as taxable, but which he thinks a court would hold
non-taxable? Or which he believes would be held a question for a jury?
The courts have furnished no answers.2
The taxpayer's knowledge of the facts treated in his return is also
often a matter of degree. He may have remained ignorant of the con-
tents of the return or of his books and records in order to avoid learning
the truth, or because he was indifferent to the possibilities of error, or
simply because he placed faith in his accountant.22
[20.] Comm'r v. Duberstein, 563 U.S. 278 (1960) (a civil case). For a criminal case
to the same effect, see United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 831 (1955). See also, Cohen v. United States, supra note 16 (jury permitted to
find that putative loans to taxpayer were income because taxpayer had no intent to
repay); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1942) (jury permitted to find that de-
fendant was, contrary to his pretensions, the real owner of a gambling enterprise, hence
the real owner of its profits); Clawson v. United States, 198 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1952).
cert. denied, 45 U.S. 914 (1953) (jury permitted to determine that money from sale of
corporate property retained by taxpayer was a constructive dividend); Davis v. United
States, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965 (956) (same).
[21.] Court opinions and jury instructions seem virtually oblivious to the.e problems,
referring vaguely to the taxpayer's "actual knowledge of te existence of the obligation
to pay his tax. ... " United States v. Shavin, 220 F.2d 208, 312 (7th Cir.!, crl. denied,
375 U.S. 944 (1962), or "a tax imposed by the income tax law." Lee v. Umted States, 238
F.2d 41, 345 n.16 (9th Cir. 1956). See generaly te instructions approved in various cases
set out in La Buy, Manual on Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 26 F.R.D.
457, 555 (1965). The Supreme Court recentiy added to confusion in James v. United
States, supra note 17. See Nordstrom v. United States, 360 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1966).
[22.] Cf. Imeson v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1151 (1950).
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Finally, even if the taxpayer knowingly filed a false return, he may
not always have done so with a "bad purpose or evil motive." One who
intentionally understates his obligations by a relatively small amount
is not guilty of a felony, for the understatement must be "substantial."
The meaning of "substantial," however, is far from clear.
23
Millions of taxpayers are arguably guilty of attempting to evade tax,
and most of them are arguably innocent too. Yet the courts contribute
little in deciding guilt or innocence or in assisting the jury in doing so.
As the law stands, almost anyone with income above the subsistence
level is a potential criminal defendant.
The Role of the Hunch in Disposing of Issues
A tax evasion case may involve the following issues: (1) Was there a
tax deficiency? (2) Was it substantial? (3) Did the taxpayer know that
his return included the deduction or excluded the income which pro-
duced the deficiency? (4) Did he know that the item in question was
not taxable in the manner in which it was treated in his return? (5) Did
he, if he filed a return which he knew to be false, do so with an "evil
motive and bad purpose?" Or, did he, if he filed a correct return or
filed no return at all, engage in "an affirmative act the likely effect of
which was to mislead or conceal" income or assets from the IRS and
thereby to avoid payment of his taxes? The jury has the predominant
role in giving concrete meaning to these concepts and, in order legiti-
mately to convict, must resolve all of the issues against the defendant.
It will usually be impossible for the taxpayer at trial to present a
plausible defense on each of the above issues. For several reasons, he
will have to select one or two and virtually to concede the others. A
stance on one issue may logically preclude a defense on another-
defending in the alternative may be lawful yet tactically ruinous. Often
a narrowed focus can gather persuasive power from the concession of
other points. Moreover, a broad defensive posture may appear, because
of its breadth, to be suspect in toto. Finally, a defense which disputes
every element of the prosecution's case risks confusing the trier of fact
[23.] See Lipton and Petrie, The Substantial Understatement Requirement in Criminal
Tax Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 19th INST. ON FEn. TAX 1175 (1961). There are, moreover, in-
stances in which a clearly substantial deficiency may have resulted from intentional mis-
statement on the return, yet where, at least arguably, the requisite "evilness and bad
purpose" do not exist. E.g., where a taxpayer mistakenly believes that it is a crime
to file a return showing tax due without enclosing full payment, and, unable to pay
his full tax and desiring to avoid committing a crime, understates his income with the
intention of filing an amended return and paying up when he gets the money. For other
possible instances, see Crowley, Bargaining Position or Fraud in Claiming Deductions,
N.Y.U. 19th INST. ON FRD. TAX 1159 (1961).
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with the result that the cogency of the Government's case on some
issues may inadvertently transfuse weaker points. Thus while a defen-
dant may theoretically put the Government to its proof on every issue,
he will virtually always make a serious tactical blunder if he in fact
strenuously contests every point.
The less defendant knows about the Government's case, the more
he must rely on hunches in deciding which issues to press, and the larger
the risk that he will tacitly concede the truth of the frailest fragment
of the Government's case. The less the defense knows about the Govern-
ment's proof and strategies, therefore, and the later in the process that
the knowledge is acquired, the greater the risk of convicting the in-
nocent.
II. The Prosecution's Burden of Proof
By defining burdens of proof and allocating duties to produce evi-
dence, the courts can greatly affect the risks of error attributable to pre-
trial ignorance of the evidence and strategies of the opposition. If the
defendant appears unduly hampered by ignorance, the burden on the
Government to make a prima facie case can be increased so that the
cogency of its proof may virtually eliminate risks to defendant resulting
from erroneous strategic or investigatory decisions.
If, on the other hand, the Government is thought to be inordinately
disadvantaged in pre-trial preparations, the prosecution's burdens can
be relaxed. It may be excused from presenting evidence on certain issues
until defendant comes forward. Thus, the Government may be re-
quired only to adduce evidence of a deficiency, with the question of
willfulness tacitly treated as a matter of defense. This adjustment can
be rationalized to conform to the principle that the prosecution bears
the burden on every element of the offense simply by saying that evi-
dence of a deficiency is, in effect, evidence on every issue; it alone sup-
ports an inference of willfulness. A court may go further and hold that
even evidence of an explanation for the deficiency, such as mistake of
law or ignorance of the contents of the return, does not keep the case
from getting to the jury-it merely presents a question of credibility.
The Government's traditional obligation to prove every element
of the offense "beyond a reasonable doubt" is one of the most nebulous
and pliant responsibilities in the trial process. It means what the courts
make it mean. Some seem to think it has virtually nothing to do with
the judge's role in controlling the jury, or with what the Government
must prove to support a conviction when judicially reviewed, but is
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merely a precatory admonition to the jury.2 4 Others construe it as a
significant limitation on the power of a jury to convict. 25 But the latter
meaning seems seldom to be given to the concept in tax fraud prosecu-
tions.26 The prevailing practice of most courts seems to reflect the belief
that the prosecution is unduly disadvantaged in trial preparation, that
there is little need for the judge to evaluate the evidence independently,
and that the jury may safely be trusted to sift the innocent from the
guilty with tolerable accuracy. Thus the government is able to get its
case to the jury with a minimum of evidence and the jury is given
broad discretion to convict or acquit.
Methods of Proof
A. Specific Items Proof
A large part of the prosecution's proof in virtually every tax evasion
case is circumstantial. Sometimes the deficiency can be proved by direct
evidence, but the other elements of the offense will almost always be
inferred indirectly. Thus, if the Government can show by direct evi-
dence that the return was false, the facts that the defendant filed the
return, knew that it was false, and intended to evade his tax obligations
will all normally be inferred from the nature of the understatement
(its size and character may be such that it would probably not have been
overlooked),27 defendant's experience in tax and business affairs (imply-
ing that he knew the proper tax treatment of the item in question),28
[24.] See, e.g., United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 761 (1943) ("The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a direction
to the jury, not a rule of evidence, ... it cannot be accorded a quantitative value other
than as a cautionary admonition'); United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944) ("given evidence from which a reasonable person might
conclude that the charge in the indictment was proved, the court will look no fur-
ther. ... "; United States v. Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940
(1956) (".. the only difference between a civil action and a criminal prosecution is in
the instruction that must be given to the jury ... "); see generally Goldstein, supra
note 4, at 1159.
[25.] Isbell v. United States, 227 Fed. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915): "Unless there is sub.
stantial evidence of facts which exclude every other hypothesis but that of guilt it Is
the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the accused." See
cases collected in Note, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in a Criminal Case, 55
COLUm. L. REv. 549 (1955).
[26.] See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) ("If the jury is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.'); United States v. Costello 221 F.2d
668, 671 (2d Cir. 1955) aff'd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (". . . as in all criminal prosecutions,
the prosecution makes out a sufficient case to go to the jury, if the evidence would have
been enough in a civil action ....").
[27.] See, e.g., Conford v. United States, 336 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1964); Sherwin v.
United States, 320 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1963).
[28.] See, e.g., Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S.
888 (1961); Wallace v. United States, 281 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1960) (lawyer-C.P.A.),
see also United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 906
Vol. 76: 1, 1966
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his signature on the return and the fact that it was received in the mail
by the IRS (suggesting that he knew the contents of the return and
mailed it)29 Ordinarily, therefore, when the Government can show by
business records or direct testimony that a substantial portion of the
defendant's gross income was omitted from the return, it has made a
prima facie case. It is up to the defendant to adduce evidence of mistake,
ignorance, or honest motives. 30
Tax evasion is not usually proved by the defendant's own records
alone, however. A tax evader will frequently fail to keep records which
clearly show his evasion or will keep such records out of Government
hands. 3' Thus, while the taxpayer's records will often be used, they will
usually have to be supplemented with other evidence. When the de-
fendant's records are inadequate, there are two basic methods of prov-
ing directly the falsity of the return. The first is by the testimony of
an "inside witness"-defendant's bookkeeper, secretary, or former
spouse32-who testifies that the defendant salted away some income
before it was recorded in the books, or that he padded his deductions.
The second method is to use witnesses who had transactions with the
defendant which do not jibe with the transactions reported in the
return. Thus, if a witness testifies that he paid the defendant a salary
(1959) (tax lawyer); Fisher v. United States, 212 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1954) (defendant's
claim of ignorance and oversight rebutted by introducing a booklet he had written
entitled, "Mind Your Own Business," which dealt in part with keeping accurate records).
[29.] It is not always necessary, however, that defendant have signed the return.
That he knew its contents and caused it to be mailed may be inferred rather easily.
See Canton v. United States, 226 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965
(1956).
[50.] See, e.g., Black v. United States, 353 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1965), ret'd on other
grounds, 87 Sup. Ct. 190 (1966); United States v. Shavin, supra note 21; United States v.
Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). It is unnecessary for
the Government to prove that taxable income was understated; the possibility that the
defendant was entitled to deductions which he did not claim, which omitted deductions
would virtually eliminate a deficiency, need not be precluded by the Government. The
burden of proving unclaimed deductions is on defendant. See Black v. United States, supra;
note 49 infra.
Tax prosecutions are, of course, not limited to instances where gross income was al-
legedly underreported. Criminal cases are frequently brought for claiming excessive or
entirely phoney deductions. See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942). In
such an event, the Government must adduce evidence of the falsity of the deductions.
Prosecutions are also occassionally based upon illegal dependency exemption claims,
Janko v. United States, supra note 12, and on the reporting of ordinary income as
capital gain, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 325 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1963). By far the most
numerous of specific item cases, however, are based upon the omission of gross income
from the return.
[31.] There are, however, many cases in which the defendant's records have been
the foundation of the Government's case. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 354 F.2d 801
(8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Goldberg, supra note 30; Moore v. United States, 254
F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 926 (1958).
[32.] See, e.g., for prosecutions relying on the testimony of former spouses, Janko v.
United States, supra note 12; Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 19R4);
Barsky v. United States, 339 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1964).
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or a bribe, and his tax return includes only "capital gains" and "business
income," there is evidence of unreported income.3 3 Likewise, a claimed
deduction can be shown false by the testimony of the person to whom it
was supposedly paid.34 This method is hampered by the typically vague
entries in a tax return. Specific sources of income, or recipients of
deducted expenses, are seldom detailed in the return itself. Usually,
there are merely general headings like "business income" or "travel
and entertainment expense." In such cases, testimony by an individual
that he paid the defendant a sum of money, or that he was not paid
any money by the taxpayer, will prove little unless buttressed by records
or admissions of the defendant which detail the vague entries in the
return.35 If the defendant's records are not available, a deficiency might
be proved by gathering together enough such persons to collectively
account for more than the income reported. But this would often re-
quire the location and production of dozens, sometimes hundreds, of
witnesses.3 6 Rarely have only a few individuals been the source of more
income than can be encompassed under some broad category in the
taxpayer's return. Careful evaders, therefore, can often make detection
and proof of guilt very difficut if they cheat in secret and make entries
in the return which are nebulous enough to cover almost any items
provable by the prosecution.37
B. Circumstantial Proof of Deficiencies
Since testimonial proof of the falsity of specific items in the return
is often cumbersome and costly, if not impossible, the Government had
to develop techniques of proving every element of the case circumstan-
tially. These techniques were first used against racketeers in the 30's.38
[P3.1 See, e.g., Conford v. United States, supra note 27, (stock sales proved through
defendant's broker were not reflected on return); Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331 (8th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 934 (1963) (unreported dividends from mutual fund).
[J4.] See Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
993 (1956) (deductions for church contributions proved false by the testimony of priests
and officials of the churches that no such contributions were received).
[5.1 Dillon v. United States, 218 F.2d 97 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 350
U.S. 906 (1955), where gross receipts were shown to have been omitted from the return
by proving that they were not recorded in the defendant's books, whereas the returns
reflected the income that was recorded in the books, thus supporting the inference that
the receipts were not included in the return; see also United States v. Hornstein, 176 F.2d
217 (7th Cir. 1949).
[36.] In Foley v. United States, supra note 28, the prosecution reconstructed the
income of an attorney by calling as witnesses 113 former clients who had paid him
fees for legal services. See also, Brown v. United States, 224 F.2d 845 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 912 (1955); United States v. Shavin, supra note 21.
[(37.] See United States v. Nunan, supra note 11 (former Commissioner of Internal
Revenue reported several thousand dollars in "other income.')
[38.] See United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703
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With judicial benediction, they produced convictions at a very high
rate3 9 Since then, the Government has come to rely on indirect evi-
dence to prove the deficiency in the typical tax prosecution. As the
Supreme Court noted in 1954, indirect methods "have evolved from the
final volley to the first shot in the Government's battle for revenue."40°
The methods employed usually fall into one of three major patterns,
each of which has its standardized procedures, thoroughly tested and
approved in the courts. Each method permits the proof of unreported
income with relatively few important witnesses.4 ' And the key witnesses
do not need coaxing, nor is there any danger that they vill appear in
court with impoverished memories, because they are usually internal
revenue agents.2 Each method can also be used without reliance on the
defendant's books and records. The essence of each technique is to
reconstruct certain changes in the indicia of a taxpayer's economic con-
dition which imply that he had more taxable income than he reported.
Since all that is required for the crime is a willfully false return which
results in a substantial deficiency, it is unnecessary to prove whether the
deficiency resulted from improper deductions or understatements of
gross income.
43
1. The Net Worth Method
The most frequently employed technique of reconstructing taxable
income indirectly is the "net worth method." Its basic premise is that
most increases in net worth are attributable to taxable income and, as
the Supreme Court put it, "when this is not true the taxpayer is in a
position to explain the discrepancy." 44 The Government offers evidence
of the taxpayer's net worth at the end of the tax year in question, sub-
(1936); Guzlk v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 545
(1932); Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931).
[39.] For a popular account of the Treasury's biggest victories during this period, we
IREY, TaE TAx DoDGms: THE INsmE oF THE T-MxN's IVARIVWr AzzuacAs PotrrnCAL
AND UuNmswoa.n HoODLUMS (1948).
[40.] Holland v. United States, supra note 26, at 126:
[The net worth method's] horizons have been widened until now it is used in run.of-
the-mine cases, regardless of the amount of the deficiency involved.
[41.] There are often numerous witnesses, but most of them merely provide routine
authentication of business records.
[42.] Typically, an Internal Revenue agent will testify about the investigation, produce
and explain charts which summarize the testimonial and documentary evidence the Govern-
ment has introduced, and will testify about the nature and size of the indicated deficiencies,
defendant's admissions, etc.
[43.] For a detailed analysis of indirect proof in tax cases, see Schmidt, Reconstruction
of Income, 18 TAx L. REv. 23 (1962), 19 TAX L. REv. 277 (1964); Krasilosky and Stein,
An Evaluation of Net Worth Prosecution of Federal Income Tax Evaders, 7 Ov.. L. Rv.
49 (1954).
[44.] Holland v. United States, supra note 26, at 126.
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tracting from this figure his net worth at the beginning of the year, and
adding to the difference (the increment in net worth) his non-deductible
expenditures. The result is ostensibly the taxable income for the year.
If this figure substantially exceeds the taxable income reported on the
return, the jury is asked to infer that the return was willfully falsified
by the defendant.
45
Most net worth increases are probably attributable to taxable income.
Accretions to net worth frequently are, however, the result of gifts, in-
heritances, life insurance proceeds and other non-taxable sources. Thus,
there is a danger of error whenever a jury must speculate on the charac-
ter of a particular increase.
But there is a more serious risk: that the evidence of a net worth
increase is false or that the claimed increase indicated is a gross exag-
geration. Since wealth may be owned in myriad forms and locations,
few people other than the owner or members of his family are likely
to know where all of it is kept. When the Government agents in a
typical net-worth investigation canvass local banks, property records
and stock brokers in a search for assets, they have not thereby excluded
the real possibility that the taxpayer has assets elsewhere or under
another name. Similarly, even the most resourceful agent may miscalcu-
late net worth by overlooking the existence of liabilities.
Another risk is that non-deductible living expenses, which are added
to the net worth increment to determine taxable income, may be exag-
gerated. The Government's evidence of expenditures is often a mere
estimate supported by proof of specific expenditures on luxuries or
large items such as homes, cars and fur coats. 40 And taxpayers seldom
keep accurate records of their personal expenditures since they have
little incentive to do so.
In sum, evidence of a net worth increase as a basis for inferring a
deficiency requires all of the following inferences:
1. The items included in the computation of beginning net worth
are correct, and do not exclude any assets owned by the accused on
that date nor overstate his liabilities;
2. The estimate of taxpayer's non-deductible expenditures is not
larger than the actual expenditures;
[45.] Whether there must be evidence of willfulness in addition to the deficicncy Is
considered in detail at text accompanying notes 135-42 infra.
[46.] See Burgin v. United States, 297 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Coleman,
272 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 909 (1956); Dawley v. United States, 186 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Caserta, 199 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1952).
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3. The calculation of net worth at the end of the period does not
exaggerate the taxpayer's assets and includes all of his debts;
4. The increase in net worth indicated by the computations was not
the result of an exempt gift, an inheritance, life insurance pro-
ceeds, or other non-taxable accession to wealth.
If any one of these assumptions or inferences is wrong, the ultimate in-
ference of unreported income is pro tanto also wrong.
2. The Expenditures Method
Evidence that a taxpayer spent considerably more money on non-
deductible items during a given period than he reported as income indi-
cates that he (1) lived in part off capital, or, (2) borrowed more money
than he paid back during the period, or, (3) had non-taxable acces-
sions to wealth, or (4) underreported his income. The first three possi-
bilities, consistent with a correct return, probably occur in the aggregate
at least as frequently as the fourth. Consequently, evidence that a tax-
payer lived beyond his reported income will probably not alone support
a conviction.47 When the Government relies on the expenditures
method, it apparently always lubricates it with something else-typi-
cally a beginning net worth too small to account for the expenditures,
which excludes the possibility that the taxpayer lived off accumulated
capital.48 When employed in connection with evidence of beginning
net worth, therefore, expenditures evidence is merely a variation of the
net worth method. Proof of the ending net worth may be dispensed with
because the expenditures during the period exceeded assets available at
the beginning of the period plus reported income. If the beginning net
worth and the expenditures evidence is correct, the taxpayer acquired
wealth during the period which was not reported on his tax returns as
income. He may have acquired it from loans, gifts, inheritances, tax
exempt income or it may have come from taxable sources. The relative
dudes of the Government and the taxpayer to identify the sources, dis-
cussed hereafter, are the same as for the net worth method.
3. The Bank Deposit Method
The major premise employed in this method is that deposits to bank
accounts are frequently gross income of the holder of the account, and
when they are not, he can explain what they are. If a taxpayer reported
[47.1 See Dupree v. United States, 218 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1955).
[48.] See, e.g., Irving v. United States, 241 F.2d 506 (7th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 353 U.S.
983 (1957); Costello v. United States, supra note 26; Hooper v. United States, 216 F.2d 634
(10th Cir. 1954).
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$10,000 taxable income, consisting of $12,000 gross income less $2,000
in deductions, the Government may offer evidence obtained from his
bank that $20,000 was deposited in his account during the year. The
inference advanced is that defendant had $20,000 of gross income,
rather than the $12,000 reported. To get from there to the ultimate
inference that he understated his taxable income by $10,000, the prose-
cution is aided by a presumption that the taxpayer claimed all the
deductions to which he was entitled, even though he underreported his
gross income. 49 Note, however, that at least the following contingencies
must be excluded before reaching the ultimate conclusion: (1) the
excess money which was deposited to defendant's account might have
belonged to someone else; (2) the money could have been the proceeds
of a loan, a gift, a sale of property, an inheritance, or exempt income
such as life insurance proceeds, damages, or insurance payments for
personal injuries; (3) the excess deposits might have been withdrawn
previously from a bank account; (4) the money might have been ac-
quired before the prosecution year and held for some time in cash
before being deposited; (5) defendant might have understated his de-
ductions as well as his gross receipts. If any of these possibilities is
wrongly rejected, the inference that taxpayer underreported his taxable
income by $10,000 is false.
There are palpably so many exceptions to the assumption that bank
[49.] The Government satisfies its burden of proof when it shows that the taxpayer
has received more income than was reported. It is then the taxpayer's burden to show,
if he can, that, even though he received more income than he reported, he does not
owe any additional tax. This rule is grounded on the realization that it would be
virtually impossible for the Government to show the negative fact that a taxpa'er
had no unreported deductions or exclusions. In such a case, the Government, having
shown unreported income, is aided by the presumption that the deductions and
exclusions listed by a taxpayer in his return are all that exist. This presumption is
based upon reasonable experience (taxpayers would not knowingly fail to report all
valid deductions), and has the effect of shifting the burden of going forward with the
evidence to the defendant, when the Government has shown unreported income.
United States v. Bender, 218 F.2d 869, 871-72 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 349 U.S. 920 (1955);
accord, Vardine v. United States, 305 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1962). This is not a presumption
which "disappears" when the defendant adduces evidence of unreported deductions. Even
when he does so, the Government keeps its prima fa*e case. See United States v. Stayback,
212 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 911 (1955); Zimmerman v. United States,
108 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1939). A different rationale is supplied in United States v. Hornstein,
supra note 85, where the court said that the deductions claimed by tie taxpayer in hisreturn constitute admissions as to the proper amount of allowable deductions and wouldthus support a conviction even where taxpayer testified that the deductions were greater
than he claimed on his return.
Some criticisms should be noted. First, th e may have less justification in a case
built on indirect proof of gross receipts than where gross receipts are proved directly,
because the Government's proof that income exceeded that reported is almost always
weaker when proved indirecty. Secondly, the "reasonable experience" asserted in Bender,supra, is subject to exceptions. Thus, a taxpayer who is reimbursed for expenses of various
kinds might very well regard this simply as non-income and would neither include it asgross receipts nor take his counterbalancing deductions. See Black v. United States, supla
note n0.
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deposits constitute income that any inference to that effect, drawn from
bank deposit evidence alone, is extremely weak."° It is strengthened
somewhat if the evidence shows regular, periodic deposits rather than a
few large sums, yet regularity of deposits is probably not a condition of
using the method.a1
When combined with evidence of a beginning net worth too small
to account for the deposits, then bank deposit evidence is also merely
a variation of the net worth method. The inference is that defendant
had a flow of incoming cash which did not come from prior accumula-
tions and which exceeded reported income. The bank deposit method,
however, does not require the use of a beginning net worth.52 Appar-
ently, if the Government shows that defendant had a business which
could produce substantial cash receipts and that he made deposits of
such receipts in his accounts, it can make a prima facie case with bank
deposit evidence alone, leaving it to the defendant to adduce proof that
the deposits did not come from income, and leaving it to the jury to
decide whether his proof is sufficient.53
4. Mixed Methods
The prosecution may prove its case with any of the foregoing three
methods, or it may employ two or three simultaneously, or combine
parts of one method with parts of another.5 4 Moreover, the three in-
direct methods outlined above represent merely the three techniques
commonly employed to construct a case. There is virtually no limit to
the kinds of evidence which can be woven into a circumstantial web.5
[50.] See Kirsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1949), one of the few reversals
of a bank-deposit method conviction for insufficiency of evidence.
[51.] See United States v. Doyle, 234 F.2d 788 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 893
(1956).
[52.] United States v. Doyle, supra note 51; Holbrook v. United States, 216 F.2d 233
(5th Cir.) cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1954); Morrison v. United States, 270 F.2d 1 (4th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959); Stinnett v. United States, 173 F.2d 129 (4th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949).
[53.] See Graves v. United States, 191 F.2d 579 (10th ir. 1951); Stinnett v. United States,
supra note 52; Zimmerman v. United States, supra note 49.
[54.] United States v. Johnson, supra note 20; United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160
(1954). See generally, Schmidt, Hybrid Methods of Reconstructing Income in Criminal
Fraud Cases, 47 A.B.A.J. 560 (1961). Frequently, of course, direct proof of specific items
will be buttressed by indirect evidence; see, e.g., United States v. Nunan, supra note 11.
[55.] In Brodella v. United States, 184 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950) and Jelaza v. United
States, 179 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1950), the Government introduced, to butress its other proof,
evidence that reported profits of defendants business were out of line with profits from
other similar businesses. The Government has been especially resourceful in recent civil
cases, e.g., Estate of Mac Crowe, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Me., 238 (1955), vacated and remanded,
264 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1959) (income of abortionist reconstructed with evidence of average
fee he charged, number of morphine tablets he purchased, and his practice of giving each
patient one pill); D & H Bagel Bakery, Inc., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 100 (1955) (income of
Bagel Bakery reconstructed by applying an industry-wide estimate of the number of
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Defendant's Admissions-The Bedplate of the Typical Case
Revenue agents who suspect fraud usually attempt to build the basis
for a net worth case by asking the taxpayer during the investigation for
a net worth statement showing changes for each of several years, and in-
cluding annual non-deductible expenditures. They often get what they
ask for.56 One reason is that the IRS will frequently not consider an
offer of compromise without a net worth statement.67 Thus, if the tax-
payer wants to settle a deficiency without criminal prosecution, the
price may include not only back taxes and penalties but a detailed net
worth statement.58 Yet negotiations for compromise, even acceptance
of a compromise of civil liability, does not preclude a criminal prosecu-
tion nor make the statements obtained in such negotiations inadmis-
sible.59
Frequently, of course, taxpayers will not be so cooperative as to pro-
vide a written net worth statement which reveals substantial disparities
between net worth accretions and reported income. The IRS may at-
tempt to get one orally, however, and often succeeds. In Vloutis v.
United States,60 for example, the IRS agents had defendant, "an elderly
man who reads and writes with difficulty, if at all," come with his book-
keeper to the IRS office, where defendant was put under oath and asked
131 questions. Among the 131 was, "How much, Mr. Vloutis, was your
net worth at December 31, 1941?" (This was more than four and one-
half years later, August 16, 1946.) At first, defendant said, "I don't
recall, I don't remember." Later, when the question was repeated, he
said, "I must have had about $40,000 or $50,000 at the time." The state-
ment was used to establish his beginning net worth.0 1
bagels produced from 100 pounds of flour to the quantity of flour purchased by the tax.
payer, then multiplying the result by the average wholesale price of bagels).
[56.] See, e.g., Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955); Smith v. United
States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955); United States v. Calderon, supra note 54.
[57.1 An offer of compromise based upon inability to pay normally must be accompanied
by a detailed financial statement. BALTEa, TAx FRatm AND EVASION § 7.5-1 (3d ed. 1963).
[58.] The dynamics of the investigation and negotiation process are considered in
detail at text accompanying notes 151-82 infra.
[59.] See Shotwel Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963); McCue v. United States,
178 F. Supp. 426 (D.C. Conn. 1959), affd, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 870 U.S. 939
(1962); Smith v. United States, supra note 56.
[60.] 219 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1955).
[61.] The case was reversed, however, for erroneous instructions and for permitting
an IRS agent to give an unsupported opinion that there was no cash on hand. Ibid. For a
similar statement which was the starting point in the Government's calculations, see
Bostwick v. United States, 218 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1955). There defendant was asked, in
1951, "Could you tell us how much you had on hand at that time?" He replied, "No, I can't
tell you about 1941, but I know what I had in 1939-that is, when I got married. I told
my wife what I had. I had around S50,000.00. I had that in cash money. When I got
married, I had an apartment house and one other house, an automobile, and some
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As the Supreme Court said about the hazards to the innocent in a case
based upon statements of this sort, "When a revenue agent confronts the
taxpayer with an apparent deficiency, the latter may be more concerned
with a quick settlement than an honest search for the truth. Moreover,
the prosecution may pick and choose from the taxpayer's statement,
relying on the favorable portion and throwing aside that which does not
bolster its position." 62 The statements are also of doubtful reliability
because the taxpayer often does not know the facts. Few people can
remember what their net worth was five or ten years before, except in
the crudest sense. 63 Unreliability is compounded by the fact that the
taxpayer is seldom more than vaguely aware of the utility of the state-
ment to the prosecution and cannot know its precise purpose.64 If, for
example, a taxpayer were asked for a net worth statement for the begin-
ning and end of 1960, he might reasonably assume that the agent was
interested only in the difference between the two figures and that if
particular assets were omitted at both ends, it would make no difference.
Yet if the taxpayer is prosecuted for evading taxes for 1961, what he
thought was an end-of-year figure will be used as a starting point for
1961, and the lower it is, the larger will be the indicated deficiency.
The unreflective verbal estimate presents a special difficulty. When
a taxpayer blurts out a figure in response to a query as to his net worth
on a particular date, there is a substantial risk of misconstruing his
meaning. When he says his "net worth" was "$40,000 or $50,000," he
may be thinking primarily of his assets and may forget about liabilities,
producing a net worth estimate which is considerably exaggerated. If,
instead of asking taxpayer for his "net worth," the agents ask more
specific questions, such as "How much cash did you have on... ?", the
figure given by the taxpayer may represent his recollection of the cash
in his safe deposit box, or the cash he had in his safe deposit box plus
diamonds, and stock. This is besides my $50,000.00 cash. I probably had some mortgages
because I had some money loaned out." 218 F.2d at 793.
[62.] Holland v. United States, supra note 26.
[63.] See Smith v. United States, supra note 56, where defendant gave the Government
a net worth statement which revealed substantial disparities between net worth increases
and reported income, yet which, according to the Government's own computations, under-
stated the beginning net worth by more than S20,000.
[64.] See, e.g., Hooper v. United States, supra note 48, where agents asked defendant
if he kept any large sums of cash in his safe. Doubtless thinking that an affirmative answer
would be harmful (it would not only be a suspicious circumstance but could increase an
ending net worth figure), defendant, in the presence of his counsel, said no, and later
repeated the statement in an affidavit. On the basis of the statements, the Government
credited defendant with only $400 cash on hand at the beginning of the prosecution
period. At the trial, defendant testified that he kept up to $12,000 in the safe. The jury,
however, did not believe him.
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his bank account or almost anything else.05 "Cash," like most concepts,
is a chameleon. If he is asked if he has any "outstanding loans," he may
interpret this to mean debts he owes others, debts owed by others to
him, or both. His response may not reveal his interpretation. Even if it
does, the agent who testifies in court may leave out that part.
The Government's use of the taxpayer's statements to build up a net
worth case, moreover, is not limited to statements obtained by the
agents from the defendant. Any statement which the accused has ever
made to anyone which relates to his financial condition is admissible
against him. Balance sheets submitted as part of a loan application are
frequently used,68 as are statements to credit agencies6 7 and insurance
companies.68 The Government has even used a statement defendant
made to his parole board while he was in prison to the effect that he
had no substantial assets;69 in another case, a letter written by defendant
to a veteran's hospital stating that he was unable to pay for medical
treatment.7
0
The prosecution may rest upon statements made several years before
the period for which the defendant is being prosecuted. 71 Time alone
renders them unreliable. The cogency of a statement made to third
parties may also be undercut by the obscurity of the taxpayer's motives
when he made the statement; his propensity to distort items may not be
properly gauged by the jury. It might be assumed, for example, that
one has no interest in minimizing net worth when applying to a bank
for a loan; that exaggeration of net assets is the only real risk involved
in giving weight to the statement. But a millionaire applying for a
$10,000 bank loan has little reason to include his last pfennig on a
[65.] See United States v. Calderon, supra note 54.
[66.] Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142 (1954); Blackwell v. United States, 244
F.2d 428 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 838 (1957); Bateman v. United States, 212
F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1954); Mitchell v. United States, 208 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1954), vacated and
remanded, 348 U.S. 905 (1955), reaffirmed, 221 F.2d 554 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832
(1955) (held, fact that statement to bank reflected market values rather than cost did not
make it inadmissible); United States v. Norris, 205 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1953).
[67.] Epstein v. United States, 246 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957)
(statement to Dun &- Bradstreet).
[68.] United States v. Burdick, supra note 56,
169.] Smith v. United States, supra note 46. See also United States v. Schipani, supra
note 16 (statement to prison officials, thirteen years before indictment, used in net worth
calculation).
[70.] Hamman v. United States, 340 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977 (1965).
[71.] Hamman v. United States, supra note 70 (six years); Warring v. United States,
222 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955) (prosecution for evading taxes for
1947, starting point was statement made in 1936 by taxpayer in connection with civil tax
litigation with the Government); Banks v. United States, 223 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 986 (1956) (prosecution for evading taxes for 1945-47, starting point
was statement made in 1937).
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balance sheet and may even be motivated to minimize his assets, if a
low net worth was necessary to qualify for the loan, or if he was contem-
plating a divorce and feared the statement would be used in the divorce
proceedings by his wife. Yet, the Government is not required to intro-
duce proof of the context in order to get the statement into evidence.72
The taxpayer's statements may also make the Government's expendi-
ture or bank deposit case. The IRS can usually find out from stores,
brokers, property records about large expenditures the taxpayer has
made, but it may want to exclude the possibility that these expenditures
were made from prior accumulated funds or assets acquired from non-
taxable sources. The agents may therefore ask the taxpayer where he
got the funds for particular expenditures, thus tying him to a story
which can then hopefully be disproved.' 3 Or they may ask if he had any
assets on hand on a particular date or received any large gifts or in-
heritances. 74 In a bank deposit case, the agents can easily get the tax-
payer's bank records but will want to get his explanation of the source
of the deposits, and usually will get one.7 Sometimes, explanations can
be found in statements to third parties. Thus, in one case,70 the taxpayer
had testified in "a judicial proceeding in Holland" that he had obtained
funds for the purchase of a house from his mother and two friends. The
Government proceeded to prove that defendant's mother had not had
the money to make such a gift and that the two friends had not supplied
any money. The court held that the jury could infer from this evidence
that the source of the money was taxable income which accrued during
the prosecution period.
Finally, there is, in virtually every tax prosecution, the use of admis-
sions implied by evasive or uncooperative conduct. While the IRS oc-
casionally fails to get explicit admissions from the taxpayer, it is virtu-
ally never unable to buttress its evidence with the fact that the taxpayer
when asked for his books and records, or a net worth statement, or some
explanation, was evasive, uncooperative, or dilatory.7 7 These kinds of
[72.] See cases cited in notes 66-71, supra.
[73.1 See, e.g., United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345 7th Cdr.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 809 (1963) (claim of cash hoard and loans); United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 403 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959) (claim of large gift from father.in.law); Murray v.
United States, 297 F.2d 812 2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, -69 U.S. 828 (19 2) (claim of loan
from named person); United States v. Nunan, supra note 11 (claim of cash hoard).
[74.] United States v. Doyle, supra note 51.
[75.] See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), vacated and remanded
for mootness, 355 U.S. 38 (1957).
[76.] United States v. Adonis, 221 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1955).
[77.] See, e.g., United States v. Doyle, supra note 51 (agents asked defendant six times
for a net worth statement, offered to trade figures, defendant said he didn't knot- the facts
well enough); Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 850 U.. 846
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admission have almost no probative value. There may be any of a
hundred reasons why a taxpayer under investigation fails to cooperate
or produce the desired explanations and many of these reasons may be
consistent with innocence. Even if they may fairly be said to evidence
consciousness of wrongdoing, however, they are unreliable because the




When it gave plenary consideration to net worth proof in tax prose-
cutions more than a decade ago,79 the Supreme Court noted many perils
to the accused presented by the methods but suggested safeguards which
it thought would adequately protect the innocent. Noting that state-
ments obtained from the taxpayer during an investigation of his tax
returns may be unreliable, the Court held that such statements would
not alone support conviction but must be corroborated.80 The Court
added that the beginning net worth must be established "with reason-
able certainty,"8' and that the Government must investigate "relevant
leads furnished by the taxpayer" which are "reasonably susceptible of
being checked," and would, "if true, establish the taxpayer's inno-
cence."182 Another "requisite to the use of the net worth method," the
Court said, "is evidence supporting the inference that the defendant's
net worth increases are attributable to currently taxable income."83 A
final requirement was proof of willfulness. Agreeing that willfulness
"cannot be inferred from the mere understatement of income,"8 4 the
Court nonetheless held that willfulness was proved in the case at hand
by "evidence of a consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of
(1955) (defendant refused, on advice of counsel, to permit agents to examine his books);
Dillon v. United States, supra note 25; (agent asked defendant about some checks and
"the defendant declined to give any information other than that all of it was not income,
which later the agent was not able to substantiate"); United States v. Adonis, supra note 76;
(defendant "elected to stay away from the investigators who sought to interrogate him
about his 1948 income.')
[78.] The premise that evasiveness or non-cooperation evidences consciousness of guilt
is weakened in the tax context because such conduct frequently will mean no more than
that the taxpayer apprehends that he may have a deficiency, which is quite different from
consciousness of criminality. Yet the difference is one which may not readily leap to a
juror's mind; moreover, the taxpayer's belief that he may have a deficiency can easily be
in error. See text accompanying notes 19-20, supra.
[79.1 Holland v. United States, supra note 26; United States v. Calderon, supra note 54;
Friedberg v. United States, supra note 66; Smith v. United States, supra note 56.
[80.] Smith v. United States, supra note 56.
[81.1 Holland v. United States, supra note 26, at 132.
[82.3 Id. at 135-36.
[83.1 Id. at 137.
[84.] Id. at 139.
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income, and of the failure on petitioner's part to include all of their
income in their books and records. 8 5
In subsequent cases, defense lawyers have seized on each of these "req-
uisites" as laying down rigid conditions which the Government's proof
must meet before the case can go to a jury. The lower courts, however,
have consistently either given the concepts little meaning or have left it
to the jury to determine whether the requisites existed.
1. Corroboration of Admissions
In Smith v. United States,"" the Supreme Court said that a defendant
who had given IRS agents detailed net worth statements could not be
convicted on these statements alone. Incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments must be corroborated. The Court stated, however, that all that
was necessary for corroboration of a taxpayer's admission -was "substan-
tial independent evidence that the offense has been committed" and
that such "evidence does not have to prove the offense beyond a reason-
able doubt, or even by a preponderance."87 The Court also implied that
statements of the taxpayer which are not made to agents while investi-
gating defendant's tax returns do not need corroboration. 8 Lower
courts have since ruled that statements made to a parole board by de-
fendant while in prison do not require corroboration.8 9 Likewise state-
ments in a loan application.9° Since the requirements are so slight,0 '
however, the courts usually hedge by finding that corroboration exists.0 2
Another type of admission that may require no corroboration is the
admission implied indirectly by an apparently self-serving or exculpa-
tory statement, the self-serving aspect of which is disproved, disregarded,
or accepted by the prosecution. Thus, where defendant claimed a large
cash hoard in pre-trial statements and this was disproved, his claim was
[85.] Id. at 159.
[86.] Note 81 supra.
[87.] Id. at 156.
[88.] The Court's holding that corroboration is required was limited to the situation
before it, where "the admission is made after the fact to an official charged with in.
vestigating the possibility of wrongdoing, and the statement embraces an element vital to
the Government's case." Id. at 155.
[89.] Smith v. United States, supra note 46.
190.] Epstein v. United States, supra note 67.
[91.] Tax returns prior to the prosecution period which show little reported income
will probably suffice to corroborate a small beginning net worth statement, see Banks v.
United States, supra note 71; Smith v. United States, supra note 46, as will evidence of
financial deprivation or the borrowing of money during the pre-prosecution period, United
States v. Calderon, supra note 54; McFee v. United States, 205 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953).
reaffirrmed, 221 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1955), or a substantial increase during the prosecution
period of visible assets, Warring v. United States, supra note 71; United States v. Calderon,
supra note 54.
[92.] Banks v. United States, supra note 71; Warring v. United States, supra note 71.
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apparently an implied admission that he had no other liquid assets--
stocks, bonds, and the like-and excused the Government from disprov-
ing the possibility.93 And where the defendant's claim of a large gift
from his father-in-law was negated, his lie was apparently adequate to
exclude all other possible non-taxable sources of the assets. 4 The cor-
roboration problem is seldom even recognized in these cases. In United
States v. Adonis,95 the Third Circuit saw the problem but said it did not
really exist. There, the defendant made several pre-trial statements
claiming that he had obtained large sums from specific non-taxable
sources. The court held that the jury could infer from these statements,
if satisfied that they were false, that his lying "was an effort to conceal
the fact and real sources of taxable gain in that year."'0 As for corrobo-
ration, the court said, "this is not a situation in which the Government
relies upon an admission, which may require corroboration. The state-
ment of the defendant is proved as a relevant fact. Independent evi-
dence of its falsity is then introduced to show the significance of the
statement." 97 The distinction the court makes is neither obvious nor
persuasive. It is difficult to see why an exculpatory statement which the
Government asserts is false in whole or in part is substantially more
reliable to prove facts implied by it, as to which the Government claims
the statement is true, than a statement which is non-exculpatory and
which the Government asserts is all true.
A relevant Supreme Court case decided the same day the Court
rendered the net worth decisions, 98 is opper v. United States.00 There,
the defendant's pre-trial statement that he had delivered $1,000 to a
Government employee but that it was "strictly a loan," was relied upon
by the Government to prove that he unlawfully had paid the money for
services rendered by the Government employee. The Court held that
the statement, though exculpatory, would not even suffice, without
"substantial independent evidence," as proof that money was deliv-
ered. 00
[93.] United States v. Nunan, supra note 11.
[94.] United States v. Sclafani, supra note 73. Since the defendant testified to the cash
hoard at the trial, however, his testimony was arguably ample corroboration of his own
pre-trial implied admission that he had no other substantial assets. And in so testifying,
he probably waived any objection to the failure of the Government to prove the non.
existence of other assets at the starting point. Cf. United States v. Calderon, supra note 54,
at 164 n.1, 167.
[95.] Note 76 supra.
[96.] Id. at 719.
.[97.] Id. at 719 n.1.
[98.] Note 79 supra.
[99.] 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
[100.] The Court rejected Wigmore's argument that corroboration is needed only of a
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The same rule should apply in tax evasion cases. The decisions of
lower courts since Smith, however, reveal a clear willingness to treat tax
prosecutions as sui generis and to extend the duty of corroboration not
an inch further than required by the Supreme Court. Thus the cor-
roboration requirement is neither a significant hindrance to the prose-
cution nor an important safeguard to the accused.10'
2. Reasonably Certain Evidence of Starting Point
The Supreme Court said in Holland v. United States, that "an essen-
tial condition in [net worth cases] is the establishment, with reasonable
certainty, of an opening net worth, to serve as a starting point from
which to calculate future increases in the taxpayer's assets."102 The
Court did not make clear, however, whether this was to be a condition
imposed by the trial judge on a motion for acquittal or was merely to
be a caveat to the jury. The lower courts seem to think it is the latter.
It is by no means essential that the Government start from a net
worth statement given by the taxpayer to the agents or to third parties.
The starting point is often established simply by asking the defendant if
he had any large sums of cash on hand, securities, or other non-visible
assets. If he says no, the Government can take him at his word and
compute the starting point from his visible assets.103 If, on the other
hand, he claims a large cash hoard, accounts receivable, stocks, securi-
ties, or loans, the agents can ask where the assets or debtors are located.
If he refuses to tell them, declines to permit inspection of the assets, or
tells the agents of a location that is difficult for them to verify, the
Government may apparently disregard these claims and credit him with
confession, i.e., an "acknowledgment in express words ... of the truth of the guilty fact
charged or of some essential part of it" and that statements denying guilt are more reliable
than confessions. VIGMoRE, EvmENcE § 821 (3d ed. 1940). The Court held instead that
exculpatory statements "may not differ from other admissions of incriminating facts.
348 U.S. at 92. It is noteworthy that in the recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 5,
Chief Justice Warren stated that the new requirements regarding the questioning of
suspects applied to exculpatory statements as well as confessions, the Court again rejecting
any distinction between the two.
[101.] Apparently the only conviction overturned on appeal for insufficient corrobora-
tion in more than a decade is United States v. Massei, 241 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1957), where a
new trial was granted for failure to corroborate admissions as to the existence of a likely
source of income. But the Supreme Court disapproved the decision on the ground that the
Government was not bound to prove a likely source. 355 U.S. 595 (1958) (technical
affnimance). Thus, the decision of the Circuit Court, being based on an erroneous belief as
to the Government's burden of proof, has not been followed.
[102.] 348 US. 121, 132 (1954).
[103.] See, e.g., Smith v. United States, supra note 46; Hooper v. United States, supra
note 48. The same is apparently true if he refuses to ansver on advice of counsel. United
States v. Mackey, 345 F.2d 499 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965).
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little or no such assets. 104 The theory apparently is that the defendant's
refusal to permit the agents to verify his claim, or to help them do so,
has sufficient earmarks of fabrication to present a question for the jury
and to permit the jury to infer not only that the taxpayer's claim of
specific assets on hand was false, but that in fact there were no assets on
hand other than visible ones.10 The same theory seems to be applied to
the claim that cannot easily be verified.10 6
Moreover, several cases hold that gaps in the starting point can often
be filled simply by estimates 07 and that it is not necessarily fatal to the
Government's case if such estimates are clearly erroneous. In Beard v.
United States,0 8 the agents credited defendant with no cash on hand,
other than in bank accounts, despite the fact that he was known to deal
with and to carry large sums of cash. The court noted that there was
likewise no cash entered by the agents as on hand at the end of the
year and "nothing to show that the amount of cash on hand was greater
at one end of the year than the other." The burden was apparently
put on the defendant not only to show error in the beginning net worth
computation but to show that the error had an effect upon the calcu-
lated increase. To do this, he had to adduce evidence that his cash on
hand at the end of the year was significantly smaller than at the begin-
ning.109
The Government's task of establishing a beginning net worth is fur-
ther eased by the willingness of courts not only to permit inclusion in
the defendant's net worth of any assets, such as bank accounts, realty,
automobiles, held in his name, without any evidence negating the pos-
sibility that he held them as agent or trustee for someone else, but to
permit inclusion in full of any assets in which the defendant is named
as joint owner, with little or no proof that none of the assets were actu-
ally contributed by the other joint owner."10
[104.] See, e.g., Mighell v. United States, 233 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S.
82 (1956); Hooper v. United States, supra note 48; United States v. Vardine, supra note 49;
Murray v. United States, 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962). This
problem is closely related to the duty to investigate "leads" considered text accompanying
notes 117-19 infra.
[105.] See United States v. Adonis, supra note 76.
[106.] See United States v. Ford, supra note 75; United States v. Frank, 151 F. Supp. 864
(W.D. Pa. 1956), af'd, 245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1957); Smith v.
United States, supra note 46.
[107.] See, e.g., Talik v. United States, 340 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Mackey, supra note 103.
[108.] 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
[109.] Id. at 89; accord, United States v. Mackey, supra note 103; Talik v. United States,
supra note 107.
[110.] See, e.g., Talik v. United States, supra note 107 (defendant's savings account with
daughter, the balance of which increased from zero to over $40,000 during a prosecution
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It seems plain that the "requirement" that the beginning net worth
be "established with reasonable certainty" is little more than a boiler-
plate jury instruction. 11 As a separable safeguard and component of
the Government's burden of establishing a prima facie case, it is, in
many courts at least, a fiction.
3. Government's Duty to Investigate
Evidence of assets and liabilities which the agents found in their
investigation has virtually no probative value apart from the quality of
their search or the explanation given by the defendant. The Supreme
Court in the Holland"2 case recognized that the cogency of net worth
proof depends on the thoroughness of investigation. But the Court de-
dined to prescribe minimal investigative procedures to support a net
worth conviction. 13 Instead, it merely required the Government to
track down relevant "leads" furnished by the taxpayer before trial
which are "reasonably susceptible of being checked" and which, "if
true, would establish the taxpayer's innocence."' 14 The Court ventured
that if such leads are furnished and the Government failed to check
them out, "the trial judge may consider them as true and the Govern-
ment's case insufficient to go to the jury."'1 0
Whether the Supreme Court intended it or not, this passage has been
construed as imposing virtually the only investigative duties upon the
Government. If a taxpayer gives no leads, gives leads which cannot
easily be checked, or which seem inherently unlikely, or which, how-
ever likely and easily checked, are not explanatory of substantially all
the increase indicated by the Government's proofs, the courts since
Holland seem to hold that no failure to investigate entitles the de-
year, was included in Government's calculations although there was no evidence of the
source of more than $15,000 of the deposits. Government held under no duty to prove the
source; jury could infer it was income). If the defendant filed a joint return with his wife,
the Government normally includes in its net worth calculations assets owned by either
spouse. The duty to negate non-taxable sources of the wife's share is not. ordinarily, a
heavy one. See Talik v. United States, supra (joint account of defendant and newly acquired
wife held properly includible upon proof only that defendant actually made all deposits);
United States v. Ford, supra note 75. For instances in which the Government was permitted
to include assets held entirely in the names of others, see United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 503 (1943); Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
930 (1951); United States v. Mackey, supra note 103 (assets held in names of three cloSely
held corporations).
[111.] See La Buy, Manual on Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 36 F.LD.
457, 574 (1965).
[112.1 Holland v. United States, supra note 26.
[113.] Id. at 135.
[114.] Id. at 135-36.
[115.] Id. at 136.
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fendant to an acquittal."" Thus, the IRS apparently is under no duty
to ask questions of any of the taxpayer's relatives, his bookkeeper or
anyone else, even though they are likely to have relevant information.
Indeed, it is not clear that the agents must even ask the taxpayer any
questions, although they virtually always do. The Government can ap-
parently survive a motion for acquittal simply by adducing evidence
that its agents checked local banks, brokers, and property records, and,
including all assets entered in defendant's name and all liabilities there
found, together with any assets in defendant's possession, a net worth
increase substantially in excess of reported income is indicated.117
The Government's duties to investigate the existence of liabilities
are no more rigorous. At the end of the prosecution period, the smaller
the defendant's liabilities, the larger is the indicated increase and the
stronger is the prosecution's case. The agents therefore have no incen-
tive to investigate thoroughly for the existence of liabilities at the end
of the period beyond that supplied by the risk that the defendant may
assert, in his defense, the existence of omitted liabilities which the
Government cannot rebut to the satisfaction of the court and the jury.
And the agents do not have to worry about satisfying the court if they
have checked out any easily verified claims that the defendant has made
before trial. As with the beginning net worth computation, the de-
fendant can apparently show gross error in the Government's calcula-
tions of net worth increases without destroying its case. Thus, where
the defendant showed that the prosecution had omitted some $38,000
in liabilities from its ending net worth calculation (the liabilities were
for outstanding checks), the court held that this did not affect the Gov-
ernment's case because there was no proof offered by the defendant that
these liabilities were not equally large at the beginning of the period. 18
Indeed, the court implied that from the defendant's failure to prove the
[116.] See, e.g., Mighell v. United States, supra note 104 (no duty to investigate claim
of buried cash by questioning defendant's son although defendant asserted that son saw
the money buried); Hooper v. United States, supra note 48 (no duty to investigate claimed
loans to and repayments from alleged debtors who had died before investigation); United
States v. Ford, supra note 75 (claimed gifts from brother and "Great Aunt Mary" too
vague to require investigation); United States v. Frank, supra note 106 (no duty to investi-
gate affidavits of defendant's co-tenant and bookkeeper that defendant kept large sums
of cash in safe deposit box).
Even if leads were given and could have easily been checked, the failure of the Govern-
ment to investigate them is not fatal unless the leads account for a substantial portion of
the indicated net worth increase. See Scanlon v. United States, supra note 56.
Where defendant gives no leads at all, he apparently has no standing to complain about
the quality or thoroughness of the investigation. See Talik v. United States, supra note 107;
United States v. Mackey, supra note 103, at 506.
[117.] See United States v. Talik, supra note 107; Beard v. United States, supra note 108,
[118.] Beard v. United States, supra note 108.
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amount of the liabilities at the beginning of the period, the inference
was justified that liabilities were omitted at the beginning which were
even larger than at the end. 19
The defendant can, therefore, rarely hope to keep a case from the
jury on the ground of inadequate investigation, even though the
cogency of the evidence rests on the thoroughness of the investigation
to the extent that it does not rest on admissions of the defendant. The
adequacy of the investigation is virtually always for the jury to decide.
4. Proof of Likely Taxable Source of Net Worth Increase
Assuming that the Government adduces acceptable evidence of a
net worth increase (or expenditures, or bank deposits) in excess of
reported income, should the jury be permitted to guess whether the
increases are attributable to taxable or non-taxable sources? The Su-
preme Court seemed to say no in 1954, when, in the Holland case, it
said that a "requisite to the use of the net worth method is evidence
supporting the inference that the defendant's net worth increases are
attributable to currently taxable income."'2 0 The Court found adequate
evidence in Holland where it was shown that the taxpayers acquired a
hotel and reported only one-fourth as much income as had been re-
ported by the previous owners, even though the hotel's business was
booming. Having offered especially cogent evidence that taxpayers had
large unreported earnings,'-' it was not necessary, the Court held, to
furnish evidence negating all possible non-taxable sources of the al-
leged net worth increases-gifts, loans, inheritances, etc. "The Govern-
ment's proof," the Court said, "carried with it [these] negations."'22 The
[119.] The e e agets until they were
produced by attorneys for the defendant during trial; but i they had been previously
known it would not have been proper to have taken them into consideration, unless
the amount of outstanding checks at the end of the previous -ear had also been
know... . The defendant's attorneys had access to his records and their failure to
produce... [the outstanding checks at the beginning of the year] justifies the inferencethat their production would not have been to the defendant's interest.
Id. at 90.
[120.] Holland v. United States, supra note 26, at 137.
[121.] There was also apparently some evidence that the books were false, although theCourt's opinion is not cear on this point. See note 137 infra.
[122.] Holland v. United States, supra note 26, at 138. It seems important to note,
however, that the Court believed, correctly, that the evidence of unreported income was
so strong that this in itsef went far toward negating non-taxable sources. Indeed, ince
there was strong circumstantial evidence that the hotel had far more income than wasreported, the se was not a typical net worth case. The net worth e idence merely
corroborated other cogent evidence of a large defidency. The context of the statementquoted above, therefore, does not justify the inference that the Government is never under
a duty to investigate possible non-taxable sources for an apparent nt worth increaseunless given pre-trial leads. But see cases dted note 116 supta.
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Court added that "where relevant leads are not forthcoming, the Gov-
ernment is not required to negate every possible source of non-taxable
income, a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant."
123
A number of post-Holland cases read the Supreme Court's opinion
as making indispensable proof of a likely source of taxable income. 12'
Yet all held that the requirement could be met with much less evidence
than was adduced in Holland. It seems sufficient, for example, for the
Government to prove that the defendant received some income from a
source not reported on his returns,12 or if it merely proves that a
source disclosed in the return is of a kind generally capable of produc-
ing the unreported income shown by the net worth calculation.1 20 Since
"gambling is an occupation with indeterminate possibilities,"'127 the
courts seem willing to find that the Government meets its burden
merely by proving that defendant is a gambler. 2 The prosecution need
not, as it did in Holland, produce evidence of the actual size and
nature of the business operations. The requirement has become in many
courts a duty merely to show that the defendant is engaged in a profit-
directed activity of some kind.
Holland held that if there is ample proof of a taxable source, non-
taxable sources must be negated only if the defendant supplies reason-
able, relevant leads.' 20 The courts seem to be applying the same minimal
duty when there is no proof whatever of a likely source.18 0 Thus, if
the taxpayer gives one explanation, such as a large gift, for the apparent
net worth increase, the Government meets its burden by disproving the
[123.3 Holland v. United States, supra note 26.
[124.] See, e.g., Olender v. United States, 237 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 982 (1957); United States v. Ford, supra note 75.
[125.] See McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953), reaff'd, 221 F.2d 807
(1955) (precise source need not be proved); United States v. Adonis, supra note 76; United
States v. Ford, supra note 75.
[126.] iSee Scanlon v. United States, supra note 56 (bookie); United States v. Nunan,
supra note 11.
[127.] United States v. Costello, supra note 26.
[128.] Scanlon v. United States, supra note 56; Campodonico v. United States, 222 F.2d
310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955).
[129. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
[130.] Some support of this extension of Holland may be drawn from the Supreme
Court's only foray into the field in more than a decade, United States v. Massel, 355 U.S.
595 (1958). The Court there in a one paragraph opinion said that although it had held in
Holland that proof of a likely source is "'sufficient'" to convict in net worth case, "this
was not intended to imply that proof of a likely source was necessary in every case. On
the contrary, should all possible sources of non.taxable income be negated, there would
be no necessity for proof of a likely source.' Obviously, the negation of all non-taxable
sources is itself proof of a taxable source, albeit an unidentified one. However, It is
virtually impossible to exclude, by solid proof, all possible non-taxable sources, e.g., gifts,
loans, inheritance, other non-taxable acquisitions. The opinion is academic, therefore,
unless it is read as dispensing with hard evidence of either a taxable source or the non-
existence of an exempt source.
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gift.' 31 The defendant's explanation itself disproves all other possible
non-taxable sources. The same is apparently true where the explanation
is not reasonably verifiable. If defendant merely refers vaguely to a
specific source, such as a "loan," without particulars, the Government
is apparently relieved of the duty to prove a likely taxable source or to
disprove possible non-taxable sources. 1 -32 It can rest on the hope that
the jury will disbelieve defendant's explanation and conclude that in
lying he was covering up the existence of a taxable source. Likewise, if
the defendant merely denies there was a net worth increase, his denial
apparently carries with it an admission that if, contrary to his assertions,
there was a net worth increase, it was attributable to taxable income.'m
And what of the defendant who provides no leads, gives no explana-
tions? The law is not dear as to him, because he is almost non-existent,
but the cases imply that the Government satisfies its burden if its agents
testify that they found no non-taxable sources.
3 4
Thus what was once thought to be an important burden imposed
upon the Government has been subtly shifted to the defendant. Either
he gives pre-trial discovery by tendering an explanation or he relieves
the Government of the duty to prove the source of the net worth in-
crease and authorizes the jury to conclude, without evidence, that it
was taxable income.
5. Consistent Underreporting of Large Amounts of Income
The Supreme Court in the Holland case agreed with the defendant
that willfulness cannot be "'inferred from the mere understatement of
income.' "135 The Court held, however, that "a consistent pattern of
understating large amounts of income, and the failure on petitioners'
part to include all of their income in their books and records" justified
an inference of willfulness.130 In every net worth case the defendant's
books will not reveal all the income shown by the net worth evidence,
for if they did there would be no need to rely on circumstantial proof.
The discrepancy between the books and the net worth evidence, there-
[131.] See Thomas v. Commr, 261 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1958) (dv il net worth case with
elaborate analysis of Massei, supra note 130); United States v. Sclafani, supra note 73.
[132.] United States v. Ford, supra note 75; see also Smith v. United States, supra
note 46 (defendant claimed apparent net worth bulge came from an "old iron pot" and "an
old mail bag.')
[133.) See Gatling v. Commr, 286 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1961); Hamman v. United States,
supra note 70.
[134.] Gatling v. Comm'r, supra note 133; United States v. Ford, supra note 75.
[135.] Holland v. United States, supra note 26.
[136.] Ibid.
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fore, adds nothing to the net worth evidence. 137 How, then, does "a
consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of income" differ
in cogency from evidence of a "mere understatement of income?" It
differs in many respects.
The larger the indicated omission, both absolutely and relative to the
income actually reported, the less likely that the taxpayer was ignorant
of the unreported income. If he reported only $10,000 of income but
his net worth increased (from taxable sources) by $50,000, the inference
may be strong that he was aware that his income exceeded that which
he reported. The inference becomes almost overwhelming when the
same thing happens three or four years in a row.
Largeness and repetition of the understatements also greatly reduce
the consequentiality of error in the net worth calculations. If net worth
evidence shows that a taxpayer who reported about $10,000 income for
each of four years actually had steady net worth increases of about
$50,000 in each of those years, it is unlikely that virtually all of the
indicated increase is attributable to the inevitable errors in net worth
evidence. As the size and repetition of the indicated deficiency diminish,
however, the risk that most of it is erroneous greatly magnifies.1 18
If, therefore, the Government were required to show a "consistent
pattern of large underreportings," as a condition of getting a net worth
case to the jury, many of the dangers noted would be greatly minimized.
The Holland case, however, has not been interpreted as creating any
such obligation. There are numerous cases in which the jury was
[137.] It is unclear from the Holland opinion whether the Court in the passage quoted
above, "failure on petitioner's part to include all their income in their books and records,"
was referring to the fact that independent evidence apparently showed that defendant's
records were inaccurate, id. at 137, or merely reflected the truism that proof of unreported
income by the net worth method, or any other method, also proves that taxpayer's books
to the contrary are false. There is language in the opinion which may support the latter
reading: "when there are no books and records, willfulness may be inferred from that
fact coupled with proof of an understatement of income," id., at 128; "the very failure
of the books to disclose a proved deficiency might indicate deliberate falsification," ibid;
"the Government did not detect any specific false entries [in defendant's books]" id. at 132.
The writers on tax fraud are, in general, reluctant to concede that Holland authorizes a
criminal conviction in a "pure" net worth case, i.e., where there is no evidence, in addition
to net worth increases larger than reported income, of falsification of books, suspicious
destruction of records, lies to revenue agents, etc. See Avakian, Net Worth Method in
Proving Tax Evasion, 41 A.B.A.J. 563 (1955); Baiter, A Ten Year Review of Fraud Prosccu.
tions, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. oN Fan. TAx. 1125, 1130 (1961). The cases, however, offer little
support for the notion that there must be direct evidence of a "badge of fraud," In addi.
tion to net worth proof, as a condition to conviction. Moreover, it is difficult to find any
such evidence in many cases, e.g., Barsky v. United States, supra note 32; Warring v. United
States, supra note 71; United States v. Altruda, 224 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1955).
[138.] Proof of net worth increases in excess of income over a period of several years
also tends to exclude the possibility of non-taxable sources for the apparent increase.
Regular receipt of large gifts, inheritances or other non-taxable accessions to wealth over a
period of years is unusual.
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permitted to convict although the omissions indicated by circumstantial
evidence were not "large" as that term was employed in Holland.130
Convictions have been affirmed where the understatements were no
more than a few thousand dollars.140 Moreover, many taxpayers have
been convicted without evidence of a consistent pattern of underreport-
ing; where, so far as it appears, the deficiency occurred in only one m1 or
two years.'1
Summary, and Some Considerations
The Government has at least six different ways of proving a tax
evasion case: (1) with the taxpayer's own books, records, and admissions,
(2) through an inside eyewitness to taxpayer's false entries or secretion
of income, (3) with outsiders, whose records or testimony permit re-
construction of transactions with the defendant; with evidence of (4)
net worth increases, (5) expenditures, or (6) bank deposits exceeding re-
ported taxable income. Each of these methods is relatively independent
of the others in that the records and witnesses employed to build the
Government's case will often differ depending upon the method selec-
ted. Whether the prosecution uses direct or indirect proof, its case
usually shows no more than substantial unreported receipts during the
[139.] In Holland, the defendants, over a span of three years during which they
reported income of $31,265.92, had an apparent net worth increase of $113,185.32. The
evidence thus indicated that they had reported less than 30 per cent of their income.
Holland v. United States, supra note 26.
1140. In United States v. Ford, supra note 75, the Government's evidence shoiied total
underreportings over the prosecution period, 1947-1951, of about $27,000. Underreported
income for 1950, however, was only about $1,100, producing a tax deficiency of no more
than $200 or $300; and the Government's evidence as to 1951 indicated an overstatement of
income by defendant of about $180. Nonetheless, the trial judge sent all five counts (one
for each year) to the jury. Not surprisingly, the jury acquitted for 1951. Con%ictions for
1948-1950 were affirmed (the jury hung on the 1947 count). It should be noted, hor cer,
that the Government had also adduced evidence of underreporting for 1942-1946. Thus,
while the omissions proved hardly seem large there was at least a "consistent pattern of
... underreporting." But see United States v. Frank, supra note 105 (underreporting in sin-
gle year of less than $20,000; apparently no evidence of prior underreportings); Chinn v.
United States, 228 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955) (unreported income for 1947 of 9,000 proved
by net worth method; specific items proof of underreportings for 1918-50, totaling only
about $6,000, proved by direct evidence); Coleman v. United States, supra note 46 (two
years' underreporting totaled about $14,000); Altruda v. United States, supra note 137;
(excluding amounts which Government conceded were erroneously but not fraudulently
omitted, Government's evidence showed underreportings of about $13,000 in 1916, $3,000
in 1947 and an overdeclaration for 1948 of about $4,000. Also, there was virtually no net
worth increase. Evidence of income consisted of expenditures); Canaday v. United States,
supra note 32 (understatements in each of five years varied from about $4,600 to $6,100).
Small omissions in specific items cases are, of course, more frequent. See, eg., Foley v.
United States, supra note 28 (about $1,000 in each of two years); Brown v. United States,
224 F.2d 845 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 912 (1955) (about $4,000 in 1946, $5,000 in
1947); Dillon v. United States, supra note 35 (less than $6,000 in each of two years).
[141.] United States v. Adonis, supra note 76; United States v. Frank, supra note 106.
[142.] Scanlon v. United States, supra note 56; Coleman v. United States, supra note 46;
United States v. Shavin, supra note 21; United States v. Vardine, supra note 49.
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tax years in question. The burden of coming forward with evidence of
offsetting deductions which were also not reported, of mistake of law
or fact, or of ameliorating circumstances negating willfulness is usually
on the defendant.
When the Government employs circumstantial methods to prove the
deficiency, the burden of producing evidence that the Government's
calculations excluded assets, loans 'or non-taxable sources is heavily
upon the defendant. And rarely, if ever, is defendant's contrary evidence
sufficient to require the Government to go forward with more evidence
or suffer a judgment of acquittal.
The Government's case will stand even though its evidence of a
deficiency may not be very cogent. An investigation of local bank,
property, and other records, without the help of defendant or members
of his family does not yield strong proof of the existence of a large
deficiency, much less of willful evasion. By no stretch of argument can
such evidence constitute proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
considered apart from the response of the defendant, it is often as con-
sistent with innocence as with guilt. Millions of innocent taxpayers
would appear guilty if the changes in their locally recorded and visible
assets were alone considered as proof of guilt.
By permitting such proof to suffice as a prima facie case, courts have
given juries vast discretion to convict on meager evidence and have
greatly diminished the value of the taxpayer's privilege against self-
incrimination, both at the trial and in pre-trial investigations. (The
usual effect of a taxpayer's pre-trial claim of privilege will be to assure
his prosecution, to relieve the Government of the duty to negate
possible explanations, and, perhaps, to create admissible evidence of
willfulness.) When a jury is authorized to convict on such thin evidence,
the principles of the Fifth Amendment are undermined. The courts,
however, do not seem to think so. The conventional judicial attitude
is to treat burden of proof and the self-incrimination privilege as
wholly unrelated. Typical is Yee Hem v. United States,143 where de-
fendant, convicted of concealing opium knowing it to have been
imported illegally, contended that a statute which made mere possession
of opium prima facie evidence of guilt compelled him to be a witness
against himself because it forced him to take the stand and explain.
Said the Court, "The statute compels nothing.... It leaves the accused
entirely free to testify or not as he chooses. If the accused happens to
[143.] 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
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be the only repository of the facts necessary to negate the presumption
... that is a misfortune which the statute... does not create but which is
inherent in the case."'" The same view prevails in net worth cases.'
Yet the burden of proof is inextricably related to the Fifth Amendment
privilege. With a light burden, the Government can merely cast sus-
picion on the defendant and force him to testify in his own defense. By
this means, the Fifth Amendment is circumvented, the prosecution no
longer being "compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured."' 46 Lessening the Government's burden because
the defendant, if he is innocent, can explain, is an attempt to "solem-
nize the silence of the accused into evidence against him"'' l which,
according to the Supreme Court, the Fifth Amendment forbids.14 8
Surely if legislation attempted to establish a mere official accusa-
tion of crime as sufficient to require the defendant to prove himself
innocent or take his chances with the jury, the courts would strike it
down, and on Fifth Amendment grounds."49 Yet the difference between
net worth proof and mere accusation is one of degree only, and not a
very large one.1 0
One thing is clear: the Government's easy burden gives it great
[144.] 268 U.S. at 185.
[145.] See Holland v. United States, supra note 26, where the Court tossed off the
problem by saying, "Nor does this rule shift the burden of proof. The Government must
still prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.... Once the Govern-
ment has established its case, the defendant remains quiet at his peril." Id. at 138-39. The
trouble is that under current standards, the Government can make a prima fade case
without producing evidence which, under any tenable meaning of the term, constitutes
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The approach in Holland implies that, so long as the
jury is instructed on reasonable doubt, virtually anything may be done with the Govern-
ment's burden of production.
[146.] Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1, 8 (1964).
[147.] Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
[148.] Id. at 615.
[149.] Occasionally, the Courts will strike down a statutory presumption in a criminal
case on the ground of no "rational connection." The doctrinal support is found, however,
not in the Self-Incrimination Clause, but in the requirements of Due Proos. See, e.g.,
United States v. Romano, 382 US. 136 (1965).
[150.] This analysis leads to the conclusion that all burden of proof questions in
criminal cases are self-incrimination questions. Acceptance of this view would require the
explicit balancing of the policies of the privilege against considerations of efficiency, a
process which is both difficult and unpopular. Ironically, the Justice of the Supreme Court
who comes closest to concluding that burden of proof and self-incrimination are inter-
dependent is the principal foe of "balancing," Mr. justice Black. See his dissent in United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965).
The problem cannot be set to rest merely by noting the difference between the burden
of producing evidence (going forward) and the burden of persuasion. As Professor Mfc-
Naughton has pointed out, the two burdens aren't very different. The quantum and
cogency of evidence which the Government must adduce to make a prina fade case
depends upon the burden of persuasion which the court actually imposes upon the
prosecution. See McNaughton, Burden of Production of Euidence: A Function of Burden
of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1382 (1955).
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tactical advantages. The lighter the Government's burden, the larger
the range of alternative modes of proof, and the greater its opportunity
to approach the trial with a defendant who must guess about which
issues to press, what records to search for, which witnesses to call.
III. The Investigative Process
The taxpayer's Fifth Amendment rights are nullified in yet another
way: the Government is permitted to treat its investigation as a civil
matter until its files are full, and to keep the taxpayer unaware of the
transmutation of the case from civil to criminal.
The IRS audits three to four million tax returns per year,151 and from
this mass selects approximately 1000 taxpayers whom it recommends to
the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. 112 The initial audit is
ordinarily performed by a regular Internal Revenue Agent who may
write to the taxpayer and request that he come in and explain ques-
tioned items or permit the agent to come to his home or office. (Some-
times, however, the agent appears without advance notice.)1 3 At this
point the audit is usually regarded as a routine civil audit and fraud is
not suspected. After the revenue agent makes a preliminary investiga-
tion, however, he may scent fraud and call in a special agent from the
Intelligence Division, whose job is to investigate criminal fraud
suspects.364 Sometimes, of course, fraud will be anticipated at the outset
and a special agent assigned immediately. Even then, a revenue agent
may be used in tandem with the special agent to develop the civil
aspects of the case and also to continue working with the taxpayer in
an attempt to get information before he learns that he is a criminal
suspect.'15
At any stage of the investigative process prior to the assignment of a
special agent, the revenue agent has virtually unreviewable discretion
to close the criminal aspects of the case by suggesting a simple defi-
ciency and thus eliminating almost all possibility that the taxpayer will
[151.] During 1965, 3,268,000 income tax returns were audited, 584,000 in field audits
and the remainder in office audits, 1965 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 23.
[152.] Of 8786 preliminary fraud investigations in 1965, the 1RS recommended prosecu-
tion in 1216. Id. at 29. There were 1032 prosecution recommendations in 196-1. Ibid.
[153.] See Austin v. United States, 297 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1961), Spomar V. United
States, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965).
[154.] SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING HANDBOOK or FEDERAL TAX FRAUD 186 (1963).
[155.] Id. at 187; KOSTErLNETZ & BENDER, CRIMINAL AsPECTs OF TAX FRAUD CASES 41
(A.L.I. 1957); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, at 1224.
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be prosecuted for evading during the years covered by the audit. Once a
special agent is in the case, he also has abundant power over the
continuance of the case into further phases of the criminal process.5 0
Less than %o of 1% of all returns audited are carried beyond the
routine audit and civil deficiency stage, 1 and even after a special
agent is assigned, the chances are about 7 in 8 that prosecution will not
be recommended. 58
During the early phases of an investigation, its character as a civil
or criminal case will be ambiguous. The revenue agent calling upon a
taxpayer to examine his books is not analogous to the policeman who
raps on the door. Since more than 99% of audits which reveal deficien-
cies are never treated as criminal cases,019 the probability is high in
virtually any case that the main purpose of the audit is, and its ultimate
conclusion will be, non-criminal. Moreover, the existence of the criminal
sanction, the dread with which most taxpayers regard involvement
in criminal proceedings, the vagueness of the crime, and the enormous
discretion of the investigator, make noncooperation by an audited tax-
payer in most cases an inordinately foolish decision. The civil aspects
of an audit also point toward cooperation. The return of almost any tax-
payer contains items upon which an obdurate agent can assert a de-
ficiency which is both difficult and costly for the taxpayer to resist.
Non-cooperation may be very expensive. 10
An audit, therefore, usually occurs in an atmosphere which invites
the taxpayer to negotiate and compromise. He will usually produce
records, give statements, make explanations, tender excuses--often only
vaguely aware of their relevance to an ultimate tax prosecution. If
prosecution results, however, his statements will be extremely helpful
to the Government in narrowing the issues in the case and easing its
burden of proof.
[156.] Apparently, if the special agent decides against prosecution and his chief in
the local Intelligence Office concurs, that is normally the end of the matter. See ScansMD,
op. cit. supra note 154, at 470. It is not even clear, moreover, that the agent's superior
routinely reviews "no prosecution" decisions. See BAL-rm, TAx FRAUD A D EVAS10n § 33-3
(3d ed. 1963).
[157.] Of 3,268,000 returns audited in 1965, only 8,186 (.27%) were investigated for
fraud. See data in notes 151-52 supra.
[158.] See note 152 supra.
[159.] Afore than 99% of audits which reveal deficiencies are never treated as criminal
cases; for if at least half of all audits result in deficiencies, then there were at least 1,700,000
deficiencies revealed by audits in 1965. See note 151 supra. Yet less than 9,000 (.5%) were
fraud audits and only 1216 (.07o) produced recommendations for prosecution. See note
152 supra.
[160.] Another powerful inducement to cooperation is the well-founded fear that non-
cooperation may result in the making of inquiries to the taxpayer's associates, clients,
customers, etc., which are harmful, if not ruinous, to one's reputation. See Hearings Before
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There are doubtless many taxpayers who are not fully aware of the
risks of non-cooperation and of the long odds against an ordinary audit
being a criminal investigation or leading to criminal prosecution.
Nonetheless, even these people are seldom uncooperative. Unless they
are racketeers or for some other reason know that the Government is
trying to build a criminal case against them, they are frequently un-
able to conceive of themselves seriously as criminals, no matter how
blatant their derelictions. 161 Consequently, they act like ordinary tax-
payers, who cooperate, negotiate, and sometimes prevaricate. They
do not run to a lawyer when the agents appear. Many people in this
context, moreover, feel challenged by the agents and see the confronta-
tion as an opportunity to exercise their special skills and untapped
courage. They "take on" the agents and attempt to lead them off the
track. Frequently, such attempts are precisely what a suspicious agent
wants to hear-just what he needs to make a case.10 2
Even if the agent suspects fraud early in the investigation, the courts
hold that he need not inform the taxpayer of his suspicions before
interrogating him and asking to examine his books. Most courts hold
that even after a special agent is assigned to the case, although his job
is to investigate criminal cases, no warnings to the taxpayer are neces-
sary.1 3 Some have even held that a special agent may falsely tell the
taxpayer that he is making a "routine audit."'01 4 Virtually all hold that
a special agent who merely identifies himself as a "special agent" or
"from Intelligence" has given the taxpayer all the warning he de-
serves, 65 despite the probability that not one taxpayer in twenty
knows that this means a criminal investigation. The courts uniformly
have held, moreover, that the taxpayer's mere ignorance of the nature
the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, supra note 155, at 1179-83.
[161.] In most instances, when the special agent calls, either (a) the taxpayer's guard
is way down, or (b) the taxpayer is guarded and sophisticated, but with illusions of
superiority and omnipotence, or (c) the taxpayer has fear in his guts and appeasement
on his lips .... And thus begins the honeymoon, the period in which records are
generously handed over ('May I take this journal with me for a day or two?' 'Of
course, anything you wish); statements are generously made, and the loss of virginal
constitutional rights is consummated on a table in the taxpayer's office.
Wald, What to Do When the Special Agent Calls, in SELECrED P"vEP1s FoR TrIE FIRsr
ANNUAL TAX INsTITUTE 8 (Arizona State University 1960). See also BALTER, TAX FIRAUD AND
EVASION § 6.2; Scsmir, op. cit. supra note 154, at 262.
[162.1 See text accompanying notes 77, 103-05.
[163.] Vloutis v. United States, 219 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1955); Turner v. United States, 222
F.2d 926 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955).
[164.] United States v. Frank, supra note 106; Palmisano v. United States, 226 F. Supp,
562 (N.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. United States v. ScIafani, supra note 73.
[165.] United States v. Scafani, supra note 73; Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
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of the investigation and of his legal rights to resist is insufficient ground
for suppression of evidence "voluntarily" given. 00
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Miranda v. Arizona,167 that
a person subjected to "custodial interrogation" is entitled to be fully
warned of his rights to have counsel present and to remain silent, may
ultimately lead to reform of tax investigations. The holding, however,
does not apply to a tax audit because the taxpayer is not in custody.
While he probably has a right to consult counsel' 08-which right is
seldom denied in practice-the taxpayer under audit is not yet entitled
to the full panoply of pre-interrogation warnings accorded the criminal
suspect who is under arrest. Neither Miranda nor its predecessor,
Escobedo,169 speak to the duty to warn one who is not under arrest.
The holding of Miranda is dearly limited to one whose freedom
of movement has been curtailed,170 and the reasons for requiring warn-
ings are more often present in a custodial context than in a less op-
pressive atmosphere. Yet unless constitutional rights are to turn on a
formality-whether the suspect is told he is under arrest before or
after the interrogation-the existence of actual custody often will be
unclear. The courts will have to resort in such cases to an evaluation of
the particular coercive conditions. Eventually, arrest will probably cease
to be a sine qua non to a duty to warn.
The Court's earler opinion in Escobedo hinted at the propriety of a
contextual test and also suggested relevant criteria in addition to
coercive circumstances, e.g., interrogation in an unfamiliar place, the
absence of friends or family, the number of interrogators, etc. The
Court there emphasized, in holding that the suspect was entitled to
consult counsel during interrogation, that the interrogators were not
engaged in "a general investigation of 'an unsolved crime"' but that
their "purpose [was] to 'get him' to confess his guilt.. . ,,m The investi-
gation had "begun to focus on a particular suspect," the "process [had
shifted] from investigatory to accusatory ... and its purpose [was] to
[166.] See, e.g., Spomar v. United States, supra note 153.
[167.] 384 US. 436 (1966).
[168.] See 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (196). But see Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 803
(D.N.J. 1966).
[169.] Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
[170.] See 384 US. at 467 (protects persons "whose freedom of action is curtailed";
duty to warn "a person in custody"); id. at 471 (individual "held for interrogation" mustbe warned), id. at 477 ("the principles announced today deal with the protection which
must be given.. when the individual is first subjected to police intenogation while in
custody or otherise deprived of his freedom of action in any way').
[171.] 378 U.S. at 485.
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elicit a confession." 172 This suggests that in a non-custodial interroga-
tion, the duty to warn may depend on the purpose of the inquiries,
which in turn may be ascertained by gauging the degree of the inter-
rogator's suspicion. If the questions are put by one who "knows" the
suspect is guilty and who, consequently, is engaged in building a case
rather than investigating a possible crime, then his subject may deserve
the Miranda warnings, even though not under arrest.
17 3
Yet even if Miranda is thus extended, it would have to be stretched to
cover the typical tax audit. As earlier noted, the nature of the early
confrontations between the taxpayer and the IRS agent will almost
always be ambiguous. Though the fact that the agent is conducting an
audit implies some apprehension that the taxpayer's return may be in-
correct, this is not the same as suspicion that the deficiency was inten-
tional. And even a hazy hunch that a deficiency was intentional is not
equivalent to an expectation that further inquiry will reveal facts
warranting criminal prosecution. Probably only a fraction of taxpayers
who appear clearly to have made intentional understatements are
regarded seriously as candidates for criminal prosecution.17 4 Therefore,
if an investigation becomes "accusatory" only at the point where the
agent has made a preliminary decision to recommend prosecution and
is seeking evidence to sustain the prosecution, most tax investigations
will be virtually completed and the Government's evidence gathered
before the duty to warn occurs.
It is possible that an investigation might be held "accusatory" when-
ever the agent expects to find a violation of the law, i.e., a deficiency;
and this may occur in almost every audit at the initial confrontation.
Taxpayers might, therefore, be held entitled to routine warnings of
their rights. But what effect would this have on the Government's
ability to gather evidence from the many taxpayers who already know
they have an abstract and often costly 75 right to consult counsel and
to claim the privilege against self-incrimination? A routine warning
given at the outset of every audit could well become little more than
[172.] Id. at 493.
[173.] A supporting rationale might be that, viewing the matter as of the time of the
interrogation, the greater the likelihood that statements obtained will in fact be offered
in a criminal prosecution, the less likely that the defendant would be willing to waive his
privilege and, consequently, the greater the need for assuring that he knows of his rights.
Rather dearly, it would seem, the question should be viewed from the perspective of the
interrogator, for it is he upon whom the duty to warn is to be placed. Hence, it is his
purpose, his intentions, his belief in guilt that determines his duty, just as it is the facts
as they appear to him that determine his duty to refrain from arresting a suspect.
[174.1 See data in note 159 supra.
[175.] See text accompanying notes 158-62 supra.
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a formality, regarded as such by agent and taxpayer alike, and therefore
would have little impact upon taxpayer cooperation. If, on the other
hand, such warnings significantly inhibited taxpayer-disclosure, this
would seldom be the result of information imparted by them, but would
flow primarily from the atmosphere of adversariness and hostility,
and the usually groundless fear produced by the warnings. Routine
warnings would cripple normal tax administration if hundreds of thou-
sands of auditees ceased cooperating170 This could be too high a price
for the problematical protection of fewer than one thousand criminal
defendants per year. Thus, it seems fairly safe to predict that routine
warnings to all auditees will either fail to forestall cooperation in most
instances, or they will not be required.
It would seem reasonable, nonetheless, to require warnings as a
condition of using the taxpayer's disclosures in a criminal prosecution.
This rule would merely compel the IRS to elect, before obtaining
disclosures from a taxpayer, whether to warn him and preserve a
right to prosecute him criminally at the cost of possible non-coopera-
tion, or to proceed without a warning and be practically foreclosed from
criminal prosecution regardless of what the investigation turned up.
Selective use of warnings would itself enhance their meaningfulness,
since the warned taxpayer would know that he was a criminal suspect.1T'
Much more meaningful, and more likely to protect a criminal de-
fendant from self-incrimination, would be a duty of the IRS to advise
the taxpayer of not only his rights, but the nature of the investigation-
what the Government knows or suspects, the precise purpose of the
evidence it seeks and so forth. In short, a showing at the outset by the
Government of both its cards and its plans to play them. Yet, establish-
ing criteria for the content of such a disclosure, and determining case-
by-case if adequate warnings were given, would be enormously difficult.
[176.] See the discussion of this problem in Redlich, Searches, Seizures and Sell-In-
crimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAx. I- Rv. 191, 210 (1955).
[177.1 The suggestion that warnings should, in effect, be optional wvith the IRS,
depending upon whether it wants to preserve a right to use the evidence in a criminal
prosecution, would have the merit of simplicity, since it would be unnecessary, in de-
termining whether evidence was lawfully obtained, to attempt to fix the point when
the investigation had shifted to the "accusatory" stage. Other policy considerations are
set forth in note 201 infra, in connection with a related proposal. There would, however,
still be difficulty in determining the proper content of the requisite warning. A Miranda-
type warning, with minor modifications, might suffice except that it might be misleading,
for it would imply that there are no adverse consequences to the exercise of a taxpayer's
rights and this is seldom, if ever, the case. Not only will refusal to cooperate arouse the
suspicion and perhaps the ire of the agent, the cases suggest that it wil be admissible
evidence against the defendant. Thus, fashioning the content of the warning requires
resolution of the questions regarding admissibility of evidence of non.cooperation. See
note 180 infta.
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And it still would not prevent self-incrimination by the many defen-
dants who at the inception of the investigation are assumed by all
concerned to be ordinary civil audit candidates unless the IRS were
also required to reveal the progress of its investigation each time an
agent dealt with the taxpayer or his attorney. Such a duty goes miles
beyond Miranda."'
8
Some auditees, of course, are represented by counsel even before a
criminal investigation is suspected. Yet even if counsel is the rare one
who is well informed about both his client's tax affairs and the general
aim of the agent's inquiries, cooperation will often be the result."0D
Few of the pressures for disclosure, built into the system, disappear
when counsel enters the case. Furthermore, counsel may be aware of
additional reasons for cooperation. He may realize that complete non-
cooperation prevents the defendant from providing leads tending to
explain an apparent net worth bulge, easing the Government's burden
of proof. He may also know that evidence of non-cooperation will be
admissible at the trial on the issue of "willfulness" even, so some cases
dubiously suggest, if the recalcitrance consisted of a claim of the Fifth
Amendment. 8 0 He can be certain, on the other hand, that evidence
[178.] For an able argument that Miranda creates a duty to warn in tax investluations,
see Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44
TAxEs 660 (October 1966). The courts, however, have not as yet viewed either Dcobedo
or Miranda as affecting tax investigations. Kohatsu v. United States, supra note 165
(Escobedo); United States v. Carlson, 18 AFTR 2d 5659 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (Miranda);
United States v. Fiore, 18 AFTR 2d 5870 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (Miranda).
[179.] Cases are legion in which taxpayers were convicted with evidence supplied in
the presence of, or after consultation with, counsel. See, e.g., Percifield v. United States,
241 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1957) (defendant executed affidavit dictated by his lawyer In the
lawyer's office admitting to large understatements of income); Hooper v. United States,
supra note 48.
[180.] The main case to this effect is Beard v. United States, supra note 108, where
the court upheld an instruction authorizing the jury to consider defendant's failure
to produce his records as evidence of willfulness and said that, while the defendant had
a right to refuse to surrender the books, such right "is not impaired" by the adverse
inferences from his exercise of the right. Accord, Smith v. United States, supra note 46.
Such cases are shaky, however, because they rest upon the assumption that there is no
privilege to withhold tax records because such records are within the scope of Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), a question which is still open. (See note 196 inyra.)
Assuming, however, that the "required records" doctrine is inapplicable, or that non-
cooperation consists of something other than refusal to produce 'required records," the
fact that the taxpayer invoked the privilege at the investigative stage should normally
be inadmissible under Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). It would seem
to follow that "non-cooperation," if in reliance upon a Fifth Amendment claim, would
also be inadmissible. One could further contend that, even without an explicit claim
of the Fifth Amendment, non-cooperation is an exercise of the privilege and cannot be
used as evidence. This is the clear import of Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 167, at
least as to one in custody. See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 468 n-37: ". .. it is impermissible to
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under
police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact
that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation . . ." There is no
apparent reason why this rule should not apply to one who remains silent or refuses to
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of cooperation will be admissible in his client's own behalf and may be
the difference between conviction and acquittal.18' Finally, counsel may
be aware of the immense formal discovery power of the IRS which can
make many efforts at non-cooperation end in futility. In virtually no
other part of the criminal process do both law and sound strategy lean
so heavily in favor of self-incrimination. 82
Thus, it seems like that the modest proposal suggested-requiring
warnings as a condition of using disclosures in a criminal prosecution-
would not seriously interfere with normal tax enforcement activities
and would seldom prevent substantial disclosure by one who was
warned, even if he acted on the warning and consulted counsel. His
disclosures, however, would be more intelligent and more reliable.
The Administrative Summons
If his informal investigative efforts are not enough to make his case,
the agent has formal discovery devices not available to the policeman.
Their availability is also attributable to the ambiguous, hence, non-
criminal character of the agent's investigation. Again, the self-incrimi-
nation privilege is little comfort to the potential accused.
All revenue agents and special agents are authorized by statute to
summon "any person" they "deem proper" to "produce any books,
papers, records, or other data" which "may be relevant" in "determin-
ing the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax," and also
cooperate with an internal revenue agent, even though not in custody. There axe cases,
however, which hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege must be expressly asserted so
that the validity of the claim can be ruled upon, e.g., United States ex tel. Vajtauer v.
Comm'r, 273 U.S. 103 (1927). The latter doctrine seems irreconcilable with Afiranda and
indefensible in the context of an administrative investigation. If an agent has doubts about
the taxpayer's right to remain silent, he is free to issue a summons, institute enforcement
proceedings, and compel the taxpayer to cooperate or claim the privilege before a court.
Why should the taxpayer, or anyone else who is questioned by one having no authority to
adjudicate the validity of a claim of privilege, be required as the price of exercising theprivilege, to mouth a particular verbal formula?
[181.] Pre-trial cooperation may also weigh heavily in favor of a lighter sentence
if the defendant is convicted. See Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 269 (re-
marks of Judge Boldt); id. at 287 (remarks of Judge Deehant). For a full exposition of
the complexities of the lawyer's deision regarding cooperation, and for illustrations of
the contrariety of expert views on the subject, see B.Lr.n, TAX F Du AND EVASION
§§ 6.1-6.4 (3d ed. 1963); ScHMinr, op. cit. supra note 154, at 256-63; Lipton, The Taxpayer
under Fraud Investigation: Suggestions for Effective Representation, 47 AMIA.J. 265
(191).
[182.] An additional factor which frequently induces attorneys to counsel coopera.
tion, even after it is clear that a fraud investigation is under way, is the hope that
cooperation in paying up delinquent taxes is really all the agents are after. Not long
ago the IRS advertised its willingness to forego prosecution of tax evaders who
confessed and paid up before the agents were hard on their haunches. See BAL'rm, TAX
FRAUD AND EVASION §§ 4.1-4.11 (3d ed. 1963). Since a reorganization of the Internal
Revenue Service in 1952, which was accompanied by a withdramal of the "voluntary
disclosure" policy, however, taxpayers cannot buy immunity by cooperation. Yet there
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to take the testimony of such person under oath.183 If the summoned
person fails or refuses to comply, the agent may obtain an order from
the district court requiring compliance under threat of contempt.184
Willful neglect of such a summons is also a crime.8s Requirements of
specificity and materiality of the summons are slight and are easily
met,186 and there is no limit on how far back in time a summons for
records may reach.1 87 No allegation or proof of probable cause or even
suspicion is required to justify a summons or an enforcement order, 8s
The Government, therefore, has the power to compel the taxpayer
to produce any documentary evidence which "may be relevant" to his
deficiencies, together with a deposition procedure that is even more
useful than a deposition under a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
because the defendant and his counsel have no right to give explanatory
testimony unless requested to do so by the IRS, nor must the Govern-
ment first apprise defendant of the precise purpose of the inquiry.
The administrative summons is theoretically a "civil" discovery
device and not a "criminal" one.8 9 Yet the courts hold that a summons
issued any time before indictment is enforceable even if the agent
admits that one of his objectives in issuing the summons was to get
evidence for a criminal prosecution. 90
is still reason to believe that an informal "voluntary disclosure" policy of sorts is still
in effect. See, e.g., the statement of Commissioner Caplin in 1962:
The coming of ADP makes this just about the best time for a delinquent taxpayer
to put his house in order .... As to those who have committed tax frauds ... the
question may arise whether a taxpayer's voluntary disclosure of his willful viola-
tions will afford immunity against criminal prosecution. I want to reaffirm our
existing policy in this regard. Even true voluntary disclosure of a willful violation
will not of itself guarantee prosecution immunity. At the same time, the Service will
carefully consider and weigh this, along with all other facts and circumstances, in
deciding whether or not to recommend prosecution. Voluntary disclosure would of
course have to be made before any investigation had been initiated.
16 J. TA XATION 104 (1962). (Emphasis added.) Thus, while it has been said that offers
of settlement while the IRS or the Justice Department are considering prosecution Is
"useless ... unwise and dangerous," BALr, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION § 7.2 (3d ed. 1963),
there are still many optimists who hope, by making a generous settlement and admitting
past misdeeds, to forestall criminal prosecution.
[183.] I.R.C. §§ 7602, 7608.
[184.] I.R.C. § 7604.
[185.] I.R.C. § 7210.
[186.] See generally, Burroughs, The Use of the Administrative Summons in Federal
Tax Investigations, 9 VILL. L. RFv. 371 (1964).
[187.] United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
[188.] Ibid.
[189.] United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
[190.] Where the summons is issued after indictment and the agent can suggest no
purpose of it but to assist in the criminal prosecution, enforcement has been refused,
United States v. O'Connor, supra note 189; Application of Myers, 202 F. Supp. 212
(E.D. Pa. 1962) (summons to third party). But if the summons is issued before indictment,
it is enforceable even if the agent admits that one of his purposes is to get evidence for a
criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 289 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956); McGarry v. Riley,
868 F.2d 421 (ist Cir. 1966), and even if enforcement is sought after indictment. In the
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Privilege as a Defense to a Summons
If a taxpayer chooses, he may invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination to resist a summons to give his oral testimony under
oath. After indictment, he may on such grounds probably refuse even
to be sworn. 91 Before indictment, he can only refuse to answer specific
incriminating questions. 92 The protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment against a summons to produce books, records and other
documents is another matter. Several courts have held that the required
records doctrine (enunciated by the Supreme Court in a case involving
price records required by OPA regulations 10 3) applies to tax records.""
Under that doctrine, records are not within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment if they are "required by law to be kept in order that there
may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions
validly established."'195 The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
the doctrine applies to tax records, however, and the Justice Department
seldom relies upon it in litigation. 90 It is usually possible to get the
taxpayer's books without it.
Few taxpayers will resist a summons and require the agent to go to
court for an enforcement order. For, if a court order is required, the
taxpayer may be burdened with producing more records, at greater cost,
than if he belatedly cooperates with the agent. Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment is usually the only shield which the taxpayer has,07 and
matter of Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 Ff2d 12 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 902 (1963).
[191.] Cf. United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
[192.] See Landy v. United States, 283 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 865 U.S.
845 (1961).
[193.] Shapiro v. United States, supra note 180.
(194.] Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955); Beard v. United States,
supra note 108; cf. United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960); rev'd on other
grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961) (wagering tax records not protected by privilege).
[195.] Shapiro v. United States, supra note 180, at 33, quoting from Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1946).
[196.] Compare the scholarly views on the propriety of extending Shapiro to tax
records: Redlich, supra note 176, at 192; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act,
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm L. REv. 687, 715 (1951). The
Shapiro case itself has not been approved recently by the Supreme Court, and its recent
decision in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control BLd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (holding
Communist registration provisions unconstitutional), although distinguishable, eems in-
consistent with Shapiro's broad dicta.
[197.] Although there have been cases equating an administrative summons with a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, see Redlich, supra
note 176, at 202, no court requires "probable cause," in the usual meaning of those
words, as a condition of enforcing a summons or subpoena. The Supreme Court virtually
read the administrative subpoena or summons out of the Fourth Amendment in Okla-
homa Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Nor is "fishing expedition" likely
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many taxpayers are not willing to bear the onus of its exercise. If, how-
ever, the taxpayer asserts the Fifth Amendment, and if the court which
is asked to enforce the summons does not apply the required records
doctrine, production can be resisted-but only as to records which are
the claimant's personal property. 19 Thus, several courts have held that
the working papers of a taxpayer's public accountant, even if in the
rightful possession of the taxpayer, are not the taxpayer's property and
cannot be withheld.199 Furthermore, since the self-incrimination privi-
lege does not apply to corporations, the taxpayer may be forced to
produce corporate records under his control, even if he is the sole
owner of the stock of the corporation, and regardless of the extent to
which the records incriminate him personally.
200
As in the case of admissions and tangible evidence obtained from the
defendant informally before warning him of his rights and the possible
consequences of cooperation, such evidence obtained by a summons
should arguably be inadmissible in a criminal trial. The courts are
correct in holding that the mere possibility of a criminal prosecution
should not deprive the agents of the right to resort to an administrative
summons; and it would not seem feasible to hold that a summons
becomes illegal whenever the agent's purpose is sufficiently focussed
upon criminal prosecution to meet some abstract standard. Yet, it is
hard to see why the dual role of the agent and the uncertainty of his
aims in using the summons should justify a court in disregarding the
fact that the defendant's statements and records were obtained in-
voluntarily by a device designed for civil investigations. An exclusionary
to be a defense to a summons, even one seeking all "books, papers, documents and
records relating in any way to the income tax liability for the years . . . ." See In re
International Corp. Co., 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). See generally, Burroughs, supra
note 186, at 382; United States v. Powell, supra note 187.
[198.] "The papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private
property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely
personal capacity," United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). See also MODEL CODn
oF EVIDENCME rule 206 (1942), denying the privilege if someone other than the claimant
has "a superior right to possession of the thing ordered to be produced."
[199.] Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Fahey, 192 F. Supp.
492 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp,
886 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959) (accountant disclaimed
any interest in the working papers; held, they were still his); Contra, Application of
House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (where accountant disclaimed any interest in
the papers); United States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472 (D. Nev. 1965). See generally, Annot.
90 A.L.R.2d 784 (1963); Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of Accountants in Federal Tax
Fraud Investigations, 17 TAx L. REV. 491 (1962).
[200.3 Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964). The same doctrine applies to
records of other entities such as labor unions, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1914),
and large partnerships, United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963). See gen-
erally, Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 394 (1964).
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rule, applicable only in a criminal prosecution, would preserve the
summons' utility as a civil discovery device and at the same time assure
that the Government could not use the summons to evade its duty to
prove guilt by "evidence independently and freely secured. 201 It would
therefore be up to the agent to determine whether the likelihood of
prosecution was so great as to justify his not using the summons.
A case for reform is not clearly established, however, by showing that
the Government is distinctly and anomolously advantaged in its
burden of proof, its informal investigations, and its administrative sum-
mons powers. There may be equally unique compensatory disadvan-
tages in other phases of the process, or extraordinary advantages held
by the tax fraud defendant. If the total balance does not unduly favor
the prosecution, there may be reason to retain present doctrines. The
justifications for affording the Government these advantages would
seem to be one or more of the following:
(1) the prosecution is uniquely hindered in its investigation of a
criminal tax case because the offense is ordinarily committed in
secret, without eyewitnesses, and without tangible traces of the
crime;
(2) the innocent defendant in a criminal tax case has uncommonly easy
access to persuasive proof of innocence; hence, his inability to
satisfactorily explain is entitled to great weight in deciding guilt;
[201.] Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). It is, of course, doctrinally unconventional
to hold that evidence which can lawfully be compelled over Fifth Amendment daims
can nonetheless be excluded at trial on Fifth Amendment grounds, but the administrative
summons is not a conventional criminal discovery tool. And the notion is not without
precedent. When the Supreme Court abolished the "dual-sovereignty" doctrine which
permitted a state to compel a witness to incriminate himself regarding a federal crime,
it nonetheless held that the States may continue to compel answers with a grant of
State immunity, but that the evidence so obtained cannot be used in a federal prosecu-
tion. Murphy v. New York Waterfront Commn, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). The suggestion above
seems consistent with that approach.
It -will be noted that the reforms suggested (both as to the use of the summons and
the duty to warn) may result occasionally in virtually immunizing from prosecution a
person who is dearly guilty, despite the absence of culpability on the part of
the examining agent. Not expecting to find evidence of fraud, he examines books
without prior warnings, or issues a summons and obtains the books. Then he finds
fraud. Under the proposed reforms, he would probably be forced to forego criminal
prosecution and to rely on civil fraud sanctions. But this is a consequence of an) of
the rules which exclude evidence obtained by illegal searches or wiretaps or in violation
of the duties under Miranda. Moreover, the price of preserving Fifth Amendment rights
in a tax investigation is arguably much lower than in more conventional cases. A blunder
by a tax investigator which permits a guilty man to escape punishment does not let
loose on society a person who threatens anyones well-being. The function of the
criminal tax sanctions is almost entirely that of general deterrence; a particular violator
needs no rehabilitation beyond that supplied by civil penalties and his avoidance of
criminal sanctions merely places him in a vast reservoir of evaders who are not prosecuted
either because they are not investigated or because they were not sufficiently good
"examples" to justify the use of the criminal sanction.
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(8) the jury in a tax evasion case is singularly well-equipped to evaluate
evidence of tax evasion and to sift out the innocent;
(4) there is something peculiar about the administrative selection
process which makes it especially likely that prosecutions will be
commenced only against the guilty; hence, trial safeguards are
relatively superfluous.
Let us examine each of these propositions.
1. Does the Government have less access to proof of tax evasion than
it does to evidence of other crimes?
That the Government has a more toilsome task amassing evidence
of guilt in tax evasion cases than in some offenses, such as robbery or
murder, where there are often eyewitnesses and physical traces of the
crime, is doubtless true. But if tax evasion is compared with other non-
violent offenses such as embezzlement, theft, price-fixing, various con-
spiracies, and many of the so-called "victimless crimes," the comparative
disadvantages of the Government are not obvious. In many of these
offenses, all the persons who possess probative evidence are frequently
in pari delicto. They are highly motivated to keep quiet. Often, how-
ever, tax evasion is conducted with the knowledge of other persons who
are not seriously implicated or who, more importantly, do not conceive
of themselves as parties to crime, e.g., secretaries, clerks, bookkeepers.
Aside from eyewitnesses, the Government can receive help from
outsiders who have dealt with the taxpayer in legitimate commercial
transactions. Customers, employers, employees, clients of the taxpayer
seldom have any strong reason to obscure their dealings with the tax-
payer. Thus, even if the prosecution were required to prove the de-
ficiency by direct evidence, there would often be ample proof available.
And when it is permitted in addition to employ the various methods of
circumstantial proof there are probably few crimes on which evidence
of guilt is so plentiful. Gathering it may be costly, but it exists and its
accumulation only takes time.
Moreover, the traditional devices available to the Government to
obtain disclosure from the accused and from third parties are at least
as effective as those available for any other criminal charge.
Traditional Discovery Devices Available Against the Defendant
A. Search and Seizure
Although revenue agents seldom resort to a search for books, pre-
sumably because other means of discovery are so easily employed and
because a search would tip off the suspect, a search warrant is available
to the agent who can muster probable cause to believe the taxpayer
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has committed a crime.20 2 The taxpayer's records may be subject to
seizure as "instrumentalities of the crime" of tax evasion, or, perhaps,
the crime of failing to keep adequate books and records. - 3 And if a
valid search warrant is obtained, the agent may seize the taxpayer's
books and avoid the fetters of the Fifth Amendment, since he has not
compelled the taxpayer to produce any evidence, but has required him
merely to step aside while the agent helps himselfir 4
Even if the summons were not available, therefore, the only way
the taxpayer could dearly avoid disclosing some records to an imagina-
tive and persistent agent would be to hide or destroy them. Yet such
conduct is a "badge of fraud," will itself constitute an attempt to evade
taxation and thus support an additional count in the indictment, will
be damaging evidence of willfulness on all counts,2 and may prevent
the use of the records or copies in the taxpayer's defense. -06 It is a
risky remedy which will be resorted to only by a taxpayer clearly con-
scious of guilt, and convinced that the Government will prosecute if it
sees his books.
B. The Grand Jury
By the time the defendant's case is ripe for an indictment, the
Government will usually have extracted all the evidence it needs from
[202.] See Zachary v. United States. 275 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1960): Levin v. United
States, 5 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1925). The Supreme Court seems willing, moreover, to
apply a special standard of "probable cause" in a tax evasion case, less stringent than
that which it applies in other criminal cases, because, it is said,
Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion has been com-
mitted often requires a reconstruction from many individually unrevealing facts
which are not subject to concise statement in a complaint. Furthermore, unlike
narcotics informants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect, the sources
in [a] tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy in-
formation. Thus, whereas some supporting information concerning the credibility
of informants in narcotics cases or other common garden varieties of crime may be
required, such information is not so necessary [in tax fraud cases].
Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224 (1965) (where the Court held that a com-
plaint under oath of a special agent stated "probable cause" when it recited the fact
that he had investigated defendant's return by interviewing "third parties with whom
said taxpayer did business" and had consulted "public and private records:' and had
concluded that taxpayer committed tax evasion by understating his income for 1956
by about $22,000).
[203.] Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Wis. 1963). The court added,
moreover, that if books and records were willfully withheld in disobedience of a sum-
mons, the records "would take on the nature of contraband subject to search and
seizure as the fruit of a crime." Id. at 50.
[204.] Evidence of tax evasion is sometimes turned up in the course of searches for,
at least ostensibly, evidence of other crimes. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 354 F.2d
801 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.. - (1966) (arrest by state officers in home on warrant for
abortion; search of home produced records used to convict for federal income tax
evasion).
[205.] See text accompanying note 16 supra.
[206.] See United States v. O'Connor, 273 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
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him. But if there are still some loose ends, he can be subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury. It has been held not a violation of the
de facto defendant's constitutional rights to subpoena him to testify
before a grand jury investigating his criminal activities, even though he
is denied the assistance of counsel during the interrogation and is not
warned of his rights by the prosecutor.207 Nor need the prosecutor
inform him that it is he who is under investigation.2 08 Seeking to avoid
legal tests of these questions, however, prosecutors often "suggest" to
the suspect that he request the "privilege" of appearing before the grand
jury or, if the suggestion is not taken,200 require him to testify before a
grand jury which is not considering his case. The latter prosecutorial
technique rests on the theory that since the grand jury before whom
the suspect testifies is not a part of the screening machinery in his case,
he is not forced by the subpoena to be a witness in his own case. Thus,
his rights are like those of other grand jury witnesses-to refuse to
answer only specific questions on self-incrimination grounds and to do
so without the help of counsel. 210
It seems doubtful that this procedure can survive long after Escobedo
and Miranda, provided there is evidence that the taxpayer at the
time of the hearing was a "suspect." 211 Yet, even if interrogation of
a "suspect" before a grand jury without the presence of counsel is
ultimately outlawed, the freedom of the prosecution to employ the
grand jury in this manner will largely depend upon the ability of the
defendant to prove he was a suspect at the time of the hearing. Since
the information is peculiarly within the knowledge of the IRS or the
prosecutor, defendant's success will depend upon their candor in
revealing their purposes in bringing him before the grand jury.
[207.] United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Scully, 225
F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Il1. 1954); Himmel-
farb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949). If the witness has become a de !ure
accused by reason of already having been arrested, indicted, or named in an information,
he can probably quash the subpoena and refuse to appear; and if lie appears, he is
entitled to some warnings. See United States v. Lawn, supra note 191; but see United
States v. Scully, supra, at 115, suggesting that the distinction in this contex-t between
the rights of de jure and de facto defendants "may be artificial and unsound." See
generally, Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE UJ. 1149, 1190 (1960).
[208.] See Goldstein, supra note 207, at 1190.
[209.] Since prosecutors can almost always get an indictment from a grand jury upon
request, declining an invitation of the prosecutor to appear "voluntarily" entails a risk
that failure to appear may result in indictment.
[210.] See United States v. Keenan, 267 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1959); Isaacs v. United
States, 256 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1958).
[211.] See text accompanying notes 171-75 supra.
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C. The Subpoena Duces Tecum
Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes
a subpoena for the production of tangible evidence "before the court
at a time prior to trial" and provides that the court may upon produc-
tion "permit the... documents or objects or portions thereof to be
inspected by the parties or their attorneys."2' Although it has been said
in dictum that this rule does not authorize a pre-trial subpoena of
documents from the defendant himself, and that if it did so it would
violate the Fifth Amendment, 13 the few courts which have actually
decided the question hold otherwise.21-4 Apparently, the defendant
whose records are subpoenaed under Rule 17(c) must produce them or
claim the Fifth Amendment even though he is already under indict-
ment. If so, he may not be able to resist the subpoena if the documents,
though in his possession, belong to someone else - , or are considered by
the court to fall within the required records doctrine.216
Government's Discovery from Third Parties
The IRS has little difficulty in getting pertinent information from
third parties with which to erect or support its case against a taxpayer.
It gets much data from required information returns2 17 and also from
third party income tax returns and supporting records.218 Banks, em-
ployers, customers, and others who have had dealings with the taxpayer
are usually willing to cooperate.219 There is rarely any reason for the
agent to issue a summons and seldom any legal ground to resist if one
is issued.2-' And there is always the spectre in the background of a
costly audit of the third person's own tax returns. Sometimes, of course,
[212.] FED. R. Caiti. P. 17(c).
[218.] United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 867 (D.D.C. 1954).
[214.] United States v. Woodner, 28 F.R.D. 22 (SM).N.Y. 1961) (characterizing the
subpoena as "not a discovery proceeding, but merely a procedure to facilitate the trial
of the case"); United States v. Gross, 24 F.R.D. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v.
Eli Lilly Co., 24 F.R.D. 285 (D.NJ. 1959) (corporation's records, since not protected by
the self-incrimination privilege, are producible.) See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1224 (1964).
[215.] See notes 198-200 supra and accompanying text.
[216.] See notes 198-96 supra and accompanying text.
[217.] More than 840 million information reports were filed with the IRS during
1955. 1965 COMM'R INT. REv. ANN. REP. 8.
[218.] An audit of taxpayer X will frequently produce evidence of the fraud of Y.
a customer, client, or employee of X, who may have to incriminate Y to dear himself.
An audit of X's return may also be a guise for gathering evidence against Y without
alerting Y or X, who may be a friend, of the fact that Y is under suspicion.
[219.] See text accompanying note 75 supra.
[220.] Occasionally, however, a bank or other institution may refuse to produce
records without a summons, then resist the summons at the behest of a valued cus-
tomer. See e.g., United States v. Foster, 309 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 192). But reldom is re-
sistance ultimately successful.
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there may be reason to surmise that the third party, e.g., a lawyer or
accountant, may have participated in an offense with the suspect tax-
payer. Enthusiastic, unqualified cooperation may be the only way to
dispel such notions.
221
Third parties, moreover, may be compelled to produce not only their
own records but any documents in their possession or under their
control.222 Thus if a taxpayer turns his records over to an accountant
or an attorney for assistance in preparing his defense, they are vulner-
able to a summons. The accountant or attorney can assert neither his
client's Fifth Amendment rights-the rights are persona1223-nor his
own-since he does not own the records. 224 Even though it exists by
statute in several states, no accountant-client privilege is recognized in
federal court.225 And the attorney-client privilege is unavailable to the
attorney because that privilege does not apply to pre-existing docu-
ments. 226 The third party summons is therefore a potent device with
[221.] See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, supra note 30 (defendant's former con-
troller and administrative assistant joined with defendant, permitted to plead nolo, then
testified for the prosecution); Black v. United States, 353 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 87 Sup. Ct. 190 (1966) (defendant's attorney and his accountant testified
against him, destroyed his claim of reliance on them and, incidentally, absolved them-
selves of suspicion of aiding and abetting. The attorney testified that a special agent of
the IRS threatened him with criminal prosecution if he did not cooperate. Id. at 896
(dissenting opinion)); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), appeal dismisscd,
334 F.2d 742 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (special agent obtained
defendant's records from accountant by saying that if he didn't cooperate the accountant
would "be in trouble"); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (two taxpayers, their
accountant, and their lawyer jointly tried); United States v. Cox, 348 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.
1965) (defendant's accountant executed affidavit at behest of defendant which ap-
parently absolved defendant. The accountant then had several sessions with a special
agent during which he was "duly warned of his constitutional rights." Ultimately lie
repudiated the affidavit and testified for the prosecution). See also testimony before the
Long Committee concerning tactics employed against taxpayer representatives, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, supra note 155, at 1375, 1388, 1405, 1407-08, 1436.
When threats do not work, rewards often will. The Internal Revenue paid $565,254
in informers' rewards in 1964. 1964 COMW'R INT. Rzv. ANN. REP. 25 (1964).
[222.] I.R.C. § 7602(2).
[223.] United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1955); United States
v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Bouschor v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963). Contra, as to the attorney's standing to
assert his client's Fifth Amendment rights, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1963).
[224.] See notes 198-200 supra. Seldom, however, does the attorney or client actually
assert his own privilege against incrimination, for obvious reasons.
[225.] United States v. Bowman, 236 F. Supp. 548 (M.D. Pa. 1964); Falsone v. United
States, supra note 194. But see Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). See generally,
Comment, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 395 (1964).
[226.] Bouschor v. United States, supra note 223; United States v. Judson, supra note
223; 8 WVIGMoRE, EvIDENCE § 2307 (3d ed. 1940). But see Note, 74 YALE L.J. 539, 546 (1965),
which is cogently critical of the mechanical application of the pre-existing document
exception.
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which to circumvent the taxpayer's exercise of his Fifth Amendment
rights. 22
7
The Government's legitimate power to produce evidence from third
parties is greater than that in most other criminal cases.2- - In conven-
tional criminal investigations, the grand jury, which affords the prose-
cution "a full fledged deposition procedure without the embarrassing
presence of defendant or his counsel,"22 9 is the Government's principal
formal discovery device. In tax evasion cases, however, the Govern-
ment has the same thing in the summons power, which may be exercised
long before indictment, before either the taxpayer or the person sum-
moned has an inkling of the nature of the investigation.
To the extent, therefore, that the Government's traditional burden
of proof is relaxed and the defendant's rights eroded in criminal tax
cases on the premise that the Government's access to evidence is
uniquely limited, the rulings rest on shaky legs. The Government is
well-equipped to get evidence against the great majority of tax evaders.
The widely held belief to the contrary arose over the past generation
because the most publicized cases have been the Government's hard
ones: those involving racketeers, gamblers, corrupt politicians, persons
who know from the start of an audit that the IRS is trying to build a
criminal case against them, and who have the power and the ruthless-
ness to make witnesses disappear or forget. But most tax fraud defen-
dants are not racketeers,2 0 and virtually all taxpayers are potential tax
fraud defendants. Moreover, there are other laws specially designed
for racketeers, gangsters, gamblers and hoodlums, many of which did
not exist twenty years ago.3 1 If those laws are inadequate or the
Government's difficulties of proof are too great, the place to rectify
[227.] See text at notes 197-98 supra.
[228.] No meaningful comparisons can be made with the Government's effective
power to gather evidence by unlawful, as well as lawful means, e.g., by wire-tapping.
electronic eavesdropping, theft and fraud. There is no reason to think, however, that
the actual freedom of the Government to gather evidence unlawfully is any less ex-
tensive in tax cases than in others. See Long, We Must Stop Tax Snooping, Sat. Eve.
Post, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 10; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 155.
[229.] Goldstein, supra note 207, at 1191.
J230.] See Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 268 (remarks of Judge Boldt);
id. at 275 (remarks of Judge Weber). In fiscal 1965, "racketeer" cases represented "about
11% of the Tax Division's criminal tax workload." 1965 Ar'y GEN. AN. RE'. 311.
[231.] E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1503 (1964) (bribery, intimidation of officials, witnesses);
§ 1074 (flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony); § 9084 (transmission of wagering
information); § 1262 (illegal transportation of liquor); § 1301 (transportation of lottery
tickets); § 1403 (use of communication facilities in narcotics traffic); § 1951 (extortionate
interference with commerce); § 1952 (interstate travel or use of mail in aid of "any un-
lawful activity'); § 1953 (interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia).
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the shortcomings is elsewhere. 232 A process designed to trap an Al
Capone23 or a "Greasy-thumb" Guzik 234 may be an even better trap
for an innocent taxpayer.
2. Does the tax evasion defendant have peculiar access to evidence
which justifies placing heavy probative weight on his inability to
explain?
Every taxpayer is required by statute to "keep such records... as the
[Treasury] may from time to time prescribe."235 The Treasury Regu-
lations require that these records be such "as are sufficient to establish
... [any] matters required to be shown... in any return. 230 Compliance
is encouraged by a statute which makes willful failure to keep required
records a crime,237 although apparently no one has ever been prosecuted
for keeping inadequate records, and it would be a rare case in which
willfulness could be proved.238 The main incentive to keep accurate
records is that the burden of proof in civil tax controversies is usually
on the taxpayer.230 Records are also essential in the operations of many
small businesses and all large ones. It might seem, therefore, that
innocent defendants have records which will permit them easily to
rebut charges of tax evasion. There are three major flaws in the premise,
however, as a justification for placing a heavy burden of explanation
on the defendant.
First, it has limited application to one, such as a wage earner or
salaried employee, who has little business need for records and who
may well prefer to assume the risks of having a few tax deductions
disallowed than to shoulder the trouble and expense of keeping
elaborate records. Many taxpayers thus elect not to insure themselves
against erroneous assessments by keeping detailed records.
Second, books of account may at one time have existed yet have been
lost or destroyed before the tax prosecution was commenced. The
statute of limitations on civil assessments of tax deficiencies is ordinarily
three years.240 Taxpayers may therefore destroy records after four or
[232.] See Avakian, Criminal Procedure and Penalties in Tax Cases-The New Policy
of the Bureau, 1953 U.S.C. TAX INsT. 549 (1953).
[233.] United States v. Capone, 93 F.2d 840 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 651
(1937).
[234.] Guzik v. United States, supra note 38.
[235.] I.R.C. § 6001.
[236.] Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a).
[237.] I.R.C. § 7203.
[238.] Cf. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
[239.] See SCHMwD, op. cit. supra note 154, at 584 (1963). There are exceptions, of
course, and one of them is where the proposed deficiency includes civil fraud penalties.
I.R.C. § 7454(a).
[240.] I.R.C. § 6501.
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five years, reasonably assuming they are no longer needed, either for
tax or business purposes. The tax years which the records cover are
closed in the absence of fraud.2 41 Fear of prosecution for tax evasion or
of a civil fraud assessment is a trivial factor in the decision of an honest
but not overly-prudent man to retain or dispose of records. Yet the
statute of limitations on criminal tax evasion is six years,242 and, through
various doctrinal devices, it can be extended.242 Prosecutions are some-
times initiated eight or ten years after the tax year in question.
2 "4
Third, even if apparently accurate records do exist, they are not
necessarily defenses to a net worth, expenditure, or bank deposit case.
If circumstantial evidence indicates that income was underreported, it
also implies that taxpayer's records to the contrary are false, and a jury
is free to infer that they are.24 5 Only records relating to net worth,
expenditure, or bank deposits squarely meet the Government's cir-
cumstantial evidence, and these records are rarely maintained, much
less preserved.
Since records often will not exonerate the innocent net-worth de-
fendant, reliance must be placed on his memory. He is expected to
recall items the Government has omitted from its computations, or
that, for example, he withdrew money from the bank and redeposited it,
or purchased a boat ten years ago with cash on hand from income of a
prior year. Attributing such powers of recollection to an ordinary tax-
payer seems dubious, especially if he is called upon to search his
memory for the first time at the trial. If the Government's theories and
the details of its computations were made available to defendant well
before trial, and before the agents called upon him to exphn, the
assumption would at least be arguable, but the Government is not com-
pelled to submit such details to defendant under present procedures.
The defendant can be asked, even before he has counsel, for an explana-
[241.] If the taxpayer's return was "false or fraudulent with intent to esrade tax,"
or if he filed no return, the tax may be assessed "at any time." I.R.C. § 6501(c). There
is also an exception extending the limitations period to six years if gross income was
understated by more than 25 per cent. I.R.C. § 6501(e). The latter provision is seldom
invoked, however, and the former, though often employed, is not a major consideration
to taxpayers who regard themselves as honest.
[242.] I.R.C. § 6531.
[243.] See Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931); United States v.
Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1952); United States v. Sclafani, 126 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y.
1954); Jaben v. United States, supra note 202; Cohen v. United States, supra note 16;
Comment, The Statute of Limitations for Tax Evasion: The Possibilities of Circum-
vention by Administrative Procedures, 55 Nw. L. Rv. 97 (1960); Comment, Conspiracy,
Concealment, and the Statute of Limitations, 70 YALE I.J. 1311 (1961).
[244.] See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, supra note 16.
245.] See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of the vaguest of assertions, and his response will be used to dis-
prove any different explanation he offers at the trial.
The taxpayer's records and his memory, moreover, may be little
help in destroying the testimony of a witness who falsely claims he
paid defendant a cash bribe five years ago or that of an IRS agent who
erroneously testifies that taxpayer made certain incriminating state-
ments. In tax evasion cases, as in others, the best defense will often be
an attack on the prosecutor's witnesses. Yet if a tax evasion defendant
has a sharper set of instruments for assailing the credibility of Govern-
ment witnesses than do other criminal defendants, the nature of the
tools has not been suggested.
The assumption that a tax fraud defendant has peculiar access to
evidence is further weakened by the fundamental differences between
tax evasion and other criminal cases in the breadth of the inquiry. In
the typical criminal case the charge is that a particular form of illegal
conduct occurred in a named location within a specified, relatively brief
period of time. The nature of the charge permits the defendant to taper
his tactics and to concentrate his defensive energies. It limits the nature
and sources of evidence that the Government can adduce and gives de-
fendant general notice of these limits. In the tax evasion case, however,
the typical accusation is that sometime during a period of three or four
years the defendant received some income which he did not report on
his tax returns. Evidence in support of the accusation may cover ten or
twenty years.246 The search for evidence of innocence must cover the
whole period too.
If, therefore, there is merit in the notion that the tax defendant has
peculiar access to evidence, it must lie in differences in the formal and
informal discovery mechanisms available to him.
Disclosure Available to Defendant
1. Informally
At the Investigation Stage
In a routine audit, the revenue agent who asks to see the taxpayer's
records will usually specify the particular items on the return which he
[246.] As earlier noted, when the Government relies upon a statement made by the
taxpayer to third parties as a starting point from which to calculate net worth increases,
the statement may antedate the prosecution period by several years, thus putting into
issue the defendant's net worth changes over a decade or more. See note 71 supra and
accompanying text.
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questions. If it is these items which ultimately generate the criminal
prosecution, the taxpayer in his negotiations with the agent will have
gotten a general notion of the nature of the suspicion. In his efforts to
dear up questions, the agent will often reveal his theories and, some-
times, the essence of his evidence which conflicts with the taxpayer's
claims.
Yet as soon as fraud is suspected-whether before the initial confron-
tation or later-the inquiries made by the agent will be an unreliable
source of disclosure to the taxpayer. An agent may ask to see the books
to verify deductions when his main concern is with understated gross
income. He may indicate concern about the tax return for 1962, when
he is primarily interested in 1959, and may justify examining the rec-
ords for 1959 because of the illumination they ostensibly may provide
on the 1962 matter. Moreover, if the agent was originally concerned
about deductions for 1962, but notices in his perusal of taxpayer's books
apparent irregularities involving different items or different years, he
may continue his probe without revealing his new purposes.
As the agent's suspicion mounts, he becomes a policeman and is mo-
tivated to get the maximum disclosure from the taxpayer while disclos-
ing a minimum of the nature and focus of his quest. This permits the
agent to extract more evidence because the taxpayer does not detect
danger and may give damaging perfunctory explanations without
clearly realizing what he is being asked to explain or the risks affixed to
error.247 If the agent can lull or mislead the taxpayer about the character
and strength of his suspicions, -2 48 the taxpayer will also be less likely to
warn his friends, family, and associates before the agent gets statements
from them, or at least will be unlikely to give them warnings which will
make their interrogation fruitless.
The confrontations between agent and taxpayer cannot help but
produce some disclosure of the Government's case to the taxpayer, but
its quality and reliability are not great. Even if the matters about which
the agent initially inquired were apparently unsatisfactorily explained,
and even if it is thus apparent to the taxpayer that these items may ulti-
mately be involved in the prosecution, there is no assurance that other
items or other years may not also be included. Once the special agent
[247.1 See the instructions to revenue agents reproduced in United States v. Frank,
245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1957): "Be cautious and alert and cultivate the confidence of the
taxpayer without tipping your hand as he may cooperate to some degree with you,
but if he finds out you are on his trail as an "R' sleuth, he may clam up, and from
then on your job will be much more tedious and a lot of harder work is ahead of you."
[248.] See text accompanying notes 154-58.
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decides he has a tax fraud target in hand he will ordinarily look for all
the evidence of evasion in all the years that are open. The Government's
case may be altered considerably between the audit and trial stages and
the audit may not even suggest the nature of the changes.
A frequently fruitful source of disclosure to the taxpayer is third
parties-friends, family, agents, banks and other businesses, who after
being questioned by the IRS, promptly report the conversations to the
taxpayer. Clever agents can throw the taxpayer off the track, however,
by asking these people for information which the agents do not really
want and by misleading them about the agents' real concerns, much as
they can mislead the taxpayer. The easiest way, of course, is simply to
audit the third person's returns.
Because third parties will frequently report to the taxpayer, people
who are neutral or actively hostile to him-former employees or busi-
ness associates, social or business rivals, envious neighbors, ex-wives-
are preferred sources of information to the Government. Not only will
these people be more willing to talk and to testify against the taxpayer,
they may be open to overtures or admonitions against talking to the
taxpayer or his attorney. The Government can capitalize on their
hostility toward the taxpayer and can employ more effectively the
inducements of patriotism and public service, financial rewards, and a
benign attitude toward the third party's own tax returns. 249 If such
persons exist, the Government is therefore highly motivated to build
its case upon them. When it does so, third parties may provide little or
no useful information to the defendant.
The taxpayer will nonetheless often know a good deal more than the
typical criminal defendant about the Government's case before the
criminal process is actually invoked. Yet this is largely because much of
the Government's investigation in routine criminal cases occurs after
arrest, whereas tax fraud investigations typically are almost completed
before criminal charges are made. The difference is a matter more
of the time when disclosure occurs, than of its quantity or quality.
Moreover, much of what the taxpayer learns will be misleading and the
pieces of information filtering back to him will often be considerably
less important to his defense than that which he might get from his
friends if he were charged with a different crime, because of the variety
and the complexity of the methods and sources of proof available to the
Government and the breadth of time periods which the investigation
and the prosecution can cover.
[249.] See note 221 supra.
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At the Administrative Level
After the special agent completes his fraud investigation, he submits
a report to his supervisor who, if he approves a recommendation for
prosecution, submits it to the Chief of the local Intelligence Division,
who reviews the case and decides whether to propose prosecution to the
Assistant Regional Commissioner in charge of Intelligence.2  If the
Assistant Regional Commissioner agrees, the file is sent to the Office of
Regional Counsel, where it is reviewed again, then sent to the Tax
Division of the Department of Justice, where another decision is made
before the file is transmitted to the U.S. Attorney for presentation to the
grand jury. At these various levels of the IRS, and in the Justice Depart-
ment as well, the taxpayer and his counsel are ordinarily given the
opportunity to appear for conferences and to produce evidence and
argument to induce the officials to decide against prosecution. = ' In the
course of these conferences, the taxpayer may get some concrete infor-
mation about the Government's case. Yet he usually gives much more
than he receives. 252 It is IRS and Department of Justice policy to give
the taxpayer or his attorney virtually no details of the case at the IRS
level, and even when the case reaches the Justice Department, the de-
fense will usually get no more than the amounts of the deficiencies and
the years for which evasion is to be charged.253 Defense counsel seldom
sees any evidence or hears any theories.
From the Prosecuting Attorney
When defense counsel learns that the file has been sent to the United
States Attorney for formal criminal action, he can usually get a confer-
ence with the prosecuting attorney. Sometimes he will get some details
about the Government's case-its theories, a description of and, rarely,
a look at some of its evidence and the names of some of the prospective
[250.] For a detailed account of the review process, see BALrEn, TAx FRAUD AND EVASION
§ 3.3-3 (3d ed. 1963).
[21.] Success, however, is modest, at least at the higher levels. The Regional Counsd's
Office and the Justice Department together declined prosecution in only 170 cases in
1964, a period in which the Intelligence Division rcommended 1,032 prosecutions. Thus,
recommendations by the Intelligence Division were accepted in about 84% of the cases.
See 1964 Coni'k ITrr. REv. ANN. REP. 23.
[252.] It appears that, in the past, taxpayers have apparently given awi-ay information
unknowingly: conferences with their attorneys in conference rooms provided in IRS
offices have sometimes been bugged. See Hearings Before the Subcommitte on Admin.
istrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 155, at
1150, 115941, 1165-67, 1223, 1227-30, 1354, 1357-61, 1373-74, 1429, 1510.
[253.] This statement is based upon discussions with Mr. Richard Roberts, Second
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice, and
Mr. Louis Bender, New York practitioner and co-author of KosrrANMz 8" B&.m ,
CmuaINAL Aspncrs or TAx FRAUD CASES (A.L.I. 1957).
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Government witnesses. Sometimes he will get nothing. What the Gov-
ernment attorney will be willing to disclose is a product of several fac-
tors. One is his attitude about the propriety and fairness of disclosure
to the defense. Opinions on this subject are widely divergent, but
most federal prosecutors probably feel that defendant deserves no
more discovery than he can get by motion.2 4 Another variable is the
relationship between the prosecutor and counsel. If the prosecutor
knows and trusts defense counsel, he is more likely to divulge informa-
tion. If there is a pattern of reciprocal cooperation, the prosecutor may
trade disclosure for concessions of various kinds in the same or in a
different case in which counsel is engaged. Other factors include the
prosecutor's evaluation of the character of the defendant and of the
plasticity of prospective witnesses. Another is the prosecutor's estima-
tion of the strength of his case. His desire to get a guilty plea will often
induce him to reveal at least the skeleton of a strong case in the hope
that the defense will surrender.
25
Generalizations about prosecutorial disclosure are difficult, since
available data are scanty. It seems safe to assert, however, that the names
of prospective witnesses are more often kept secret than divulged, that
the prosecutor seldom permits defense counsel to examine and copy
documentary evidence unless it is clear that disclosure will be compelled
by court order, that the weaker the Government's case the less dis-
closure is likely to be made, and that prosecutorial disclosure is no more
generous in a tax fraud case than in other criminal cases. 250 Only in the
rare case in which the prosecutor has serious doubts about defendant's
guilt is he likely to divulge evidence which reveals weaknesses in his
[254.] Apparently the only published poll of prosecutor's attitudes toward discovery
in criminal cases appears in Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 118-20
(1963). The sample, however, consisted of only fourteen assistant United States attorneys
in the District of Columbia. Nine of the fourteen thought defendants were "not generally
handicapped by lack of discovery." Id. at 118. Only three thought "judicial pre-trial
discovery rulings too restrictive against defendants." Id. at 119. See also Loulsell, Criminal
Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALrF. L. REV. 56, 58 n.6 (1961):
one like the author whose experience in criminal cases has been at the defen.
dant's side of the table-may be pardoned a skeptical inquiry whether [voluntary
disclosure by prosecutors] is not done most typically in cases where it is believed
that sharing the information will induce a plea of guilty. Probably many prosecutors
will in any case not yield more than they must.
[255.] Of fourteen assistant United States Attorneys polled, 79%o said that the "likeli-
hood of a guilty plea" was a factor in their decision to grant or withhold informal dis-
covery. Of seventeen defense attorneys practicing in the District of Columbia, 94%
believed this was a factor in the prosecutor's decision. Discovery in Federal Criminal
Cases, supra note 254, at 116.
[256.] The United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut recently made news
by announcing that henceforth he would exchange all his evidence before trial with
counsel for the defense, except in "cases involving complicated financial transactions."
Jon 0. Newman quoted in Time, Sept. 30, 1966, p. 62.
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case or suggests possible gaps in the government's proofs. Thus, even
when the prosecutor purports to summarize his evidence for defense
counsel, he will have sifted and pruned it to wear its best face.
2. Formal Devices to Compel Disclosure
Tax prosecutions present two possible means of obtaining disclosure
from the prosecution which are not available in other criminal cases:
resisting an IRS summons and commencing a civil suit. Both devices
result from the fact that civil and criminal sanctions cover the same
conduct, are investigated and invoked in large part by the same persons,
and may be enforced simultaneously or alternatively.257 In the case of
the summons, however, disclosure is denied because of considerations of
efficiency having to do with the enforcement of civil sanctions, and in
the civil refund suit disclosure is refused because notions of pre-trial
secrecy applicable to criminal sanctions are regarded as paramount.
Thus, whether civil or criminal criteria control depends upon which
choice serves the purposes of the IRS.
A. Resisting a Summons
Some cases used to permit the taxpayer to get a glimmer of the
Government's theory before indictment by permitting him to resist
an IRS summons for records more than three years old unless the
Government supported its request for the summons by factual allega-
tions of fraud.258 The theory was that since the statute of limitations on
tax deficiencies is normally three years in the absence of fraud,0 a
summons for records more than three years old was not reasonably
related to tax collection unless there was probable cause to believe that
civil fraud had been committed. The Supreme Court, however, rejected
the argument in United States v. Powell,- 0 holding that a summons for
years dosed by the normal statute of limitations for civil assessments
need be supported neither by proof nor allegation of fraud. Said the
Court, "we reject any such interpretation because it might seriously
hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks war-
[257.] A penalty of 50% of the deficiency may be recovered from any taxpayer at
any time if "any part" of the deficiency was "due to fraud." I.R.C. § 6653(b). A conviction
for tax evasion normally is followed by an assertion of civil fraud penalties, though
civil fraud penalties are frequently assessed against taxpayers who are not criminally
prosecuted. Acquittal on a charge of tax evasion does not bar civil penalties. Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 591 (1938).
[258.] E.g., O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958).
[259.] See note 241 supra.
[260.] 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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ranted .... -"261 Instead, said the Court, "inquiry must not be limited
by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation."2 02
A footnote in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Powell case,
however, has raised hopes of defense counsel along another line. The
Court said that if the summoned person refuses to comply and forces
the agent to seek a court order, "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply.... The proceedings are instituted by filing a complaint, fol.
lowed by answer and hearing."2 3 Theretofore, the usual procedure was
considerably less formal.2 4 The Court's footnote leads some to hope
that by resisting a summons the taxpayer can force the IRS to file a
"civil action," bringing all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into
play, including those authorizing interrogatories, depositions and in-
spection of documents. Even so, however, it would not follow that an
action by the IRS to enforce a summons justifies the use of discovery
devices to uncover the Government's evidence of fraud. Such probes
would probably fail the test that they must be "relevant to the subject
matter of the pending action," 23 a limitation on the scope of all dis-
covery devices under the civil rules.
2 0
B. Civil Refund Suit
Another possible technique for obtaining discovery is for the tax-
payer to institute a civil refund action in the district court, alleging that
he overpaid his taxes. The liberal civil discovery devices would then be
available and could be helpful in uncovering the Government's crimi.
nal case-or so it was hoped. In Campbell v. Eastland,2 7 however, the
Fifth Circuit reversed a district judge who granted discovery in a civil
refund case because a criminal prosecution was pending against the
taxpayer, although the refund request had been filed before any fraud
investigation 28 and more than two years before the Justice Department
[261.] Id. at 53-54.
[262.] Id. at 57, quoting from Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
216 (1946), and quoting also the statement in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 642-43 (1950), that the agency "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law
is being violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is not."
[263.] 379 U.S. at 58 n.18.
[264.] See Bender, The Implications of Reisman v. Caplin in Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 28d
INST. ON FED. TAx 1293, 1311 (1965).
[265.] FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
[266.] Since the Court held in Powell that the agent need have neither evidence
nor suspicion of fraud to justify a summons, United States v. Powell, supra note 260,
his evidence and his suspicions would seem clearly irrelevant to any issue in the en-
forcement proceeding. But see Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp 190, 193 (N.D. Ill. 1966)
(permitting limited depositioning of the special agent who sought an enforcement order),
[267.] 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
[268.] Actually, the refund request apparently precipitated a routine audit about a
year later, which became a fraud investigation two weeks after that. See id. at 480.
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authorized submission of the case to a grand jury, and even though the
civil action was assumed to have been filed in good faith and not merely
as an effort to get criminal discovery, and notwithstanding the fact that
defendant had not been indicted when the discovery order was made.
After stating that in civil tax cases, "we start with the feeling that
fundamental fairness to both sides-the Government starts with a great
advantage in investigative resources-requires recognition of the tax-
payer's right to pre-trial discovery of the reports of the Internal Reve-
nue Agent who examined the taxpayer's books,"2 O the court proceeded
to hold that the "public interest in a criminal prosecution" outweighed
the "private interests in civil litigation" and therefore required a deter-
mination of priority in favor of the pending criminal case and the pre-
trial secrecy which went with it.270
Thus, only in the rare instance in which the Government actually
assesses a civil deficiency is the defendant entitled to civil discovery
while a criminal case pends,2 71 and probably even then the court in
the civil case will yield to a Government request to postpone the civil
trial, and discovery, until the criminal case is over. 72
C. Traditional Devices
The taxpayer, like other criminal defendants, must rely chiefly on
traditional discovery devices: motions to suppress evidence, to obtain a
bill of particulars, and to inspect evidentiary documents. The general
inadequacy of these devices has been explored by othersr0 and will
not be repeated here. It is often assumed, however, that these devices
are considerably more useful to tax fraud defendants than to others,
[269.] Id. at 485.
[270.] Id. at 487.
[271.] See Frazier v. Phinney, 24 F.R.D. 406 (SD. Tex. 1959). The Government's policy
is against assessing dvil penalties or deficiencies while criminal prosecution is being con-
sidered. Scmuaru, op. cit. supra note 154, at 19. The only apparent reason is to prevent
the taxpayer from maneuvering the civil case into the Tax Court or the District Court
and flushing out the Government's criminal case. Since there is no statute of limitations
for civil deficiencies due to fraud, see note 241 supra, the Government risks little by
delaying assessment.
1272.] Even if the Government assesses a deficiency, it can normally get the Tax
Court or the District Court to delay the dvil proceedings, and discovery if any, until the
criminal trial is over. See SCHMIT, op. cit. supra note 154, at 20; United States v. Bridges
86 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (naturalization proceeding). For exceptional cases in
which the courts granted discovery despite pendency of criminal proceedings. sce Comm r
v. Licavoli, 252 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1958); United States v. Brodson, 155 F. Supp. 407
(ED. Wis. 1957).
[275.] See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 CAuir. L. Rzv.
56 (1961); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YAM.n L.J. 1149 (1960); Developments in the Lam-Discotery, 74 Hnv. L
Rav. 940, 1051-64 (1961); Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963).
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probably because of the documentary nature of much of the Govern-
ment's proof. Moreover, since the Rules of Criminal Procedure were
recently revised in response to the case for more liberal disclosure to the
defendant, it is necessary to take a brief look at what is available.
It should be noted at the outset that perhaps the most important
discovery device in the criminal process, the preliminary hearing, is not
available to one accused of tax evasion. The preliminary hearing, it has
been held, is available only to an accused who is in custody and has not
been indicted.274 In tax cases, the Government virtually always post-
pones arresting the suspect until the grand jury has returned an indict-




Motions or petitions to suppress evidence may be brought before or
after indictment.276 Since there is no duty to warn the taxpayer during
an investigation of his tax returns, nothing short of misrepresentation
or theft on the part of the agent in obtaining the taxpayer's books or
statements will constitute an illegal seizure and grounds to have the
evidence suppressed. Nonetheless, a resourceful taxpayer might move to
suppress evidence in the hope of smoking out the Government's case
with discovery orders and depositions ostensibly needed to prepare for
the suppression hearing. Since the proceeding if brought before indict-
ment is a "civil action," the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable. Yet
courts often dispose of these motions without even granting a hearing,
much less discovery, relying upon the failure of opposing affidavits to
raise material issues or upon "lack of equity.12 77 And even if a judge
grants a hearing, he will seldom make any significant discovery orders
because the materials sought-usually the reports of the investigating
revenue agents-will be unrelated to the narrow issue of illegal sei-
zure.2 78 It would, of course, be otherwise if the nature of the agent's
[274.] Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
1275.] See Jaben v. United States, supra note 202, at 220.
[276.] Palmisano v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 93413 (N.D.N.Y. 1963) (no
indictment); Lord v. Kelly, supra note 221. After indictment, the proceeding Is brought
under FED. R. Cium. P. 41(e).
[277.] See Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960) (saying that hearings
should not be held unless the petition alleges facts which, if true, would warrant relief);
Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952) (im-
plying that the district judge has substantial freedom to deny a hearing for lack of
equity); Parrish v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 793 (D. Mont. 1966) (hearing is discre-
tionary).
[278.] See United States v. Foley, 283 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1960).
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suspicions and his purposes at the time of the audit were held to create
a duty to warn when the agent had focussed on the taxpayer as an "ac-
cused.' 279 Then, the agent's reports and other memoranda would be
relevant in determining his duties to warn and, consequently, the legal-
ity of his obtaining the evidence.280 Thus, the freedom of the agent to
employ guise not only permits him to get more disclosure from the
taxpayer, 281 it indirectly enables him to stave off attempts by the tax-
payer to get discovery from him through formal processes. 2
Bill of Particulars
The typical indictment in a tax prosecution reveals virtually noth-
ing.2 3 Hence, the defendant's main hope in getting some of the details
[279.] See text at notes 162-66, supra.
[280.] The notes and reports might still be privileged from pre-trial production,
however, under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1964) (emphasis added), which provides:.
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in
the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the
Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said
witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
An agent's notes or reports would not seem to be a "statement" of defendant's unless
made contemporaneously with the defendant's oral statements and constituting a sub-
stantially verbatim account. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3500(e)(1), (2) (1964). The notes would
therefore be "statements" of the agent only and probably immune from pre.trial dis-
covery. See note 303 infra. There are, however, at least three possible escapes from Jencks
Act immunity, if a court is inclined to grant discovery. The court can interpret "in any
criminal prosecution" literally, and hold that the Jencks immunity does not attach
before indictment. But cf. Campbell v. Eastland, supra note 267, at 486. Alternatively,
the court can construe "in the trial of the case" not to refer merely to the trial on the
merits, but to any hearing or trial on subsidiary issues, such as, eg., a petition or
motion to suppress evidence. Thus, the agents' reports would be producible after their
direct testimony at the hearing. Third, the court could hold that even if the documents
are privileged, this does not permit the Government to defeat the taxpayer's motion
to suppress; the Government may be put to a choice: waive the privilege or be en-
joined from using the allegedly tainted evidence. Cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 85185 (N.D. Ohio 1964); United States v. Andolschek,
142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944); McCoa"Kc, Ev Dac 305 (1954).
[281.) See text accompanying notes 163-66 supra.
[282.] See, however, United States v. Gower, 65-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 97059 (M.D. Pa.
1965), which granted pre-hearing discovery to taxpayer to assist him in preparing to
support his motion to suppress, of inter alia, agents' manual of instructions, and "all in-
formation, reports and administrative files pertaining to (thel investigation." The Jencks
Act issue was apparently not raised, but a general claim of Government privilege was
raised and rejected. The court in Cower, contrary to all authority, assumed that once
the investigation shifts "from a routine cvil investigatory stage to the accusatory stage
where a criminal prosecution against defendant [is] contemplated," the defendant is
entitled to be "properly and adequately advised of his constitutional rights:'
[283.] All that is customarily set forth in the indictment are the years in which the
taxpayer allegedly committed attempts to avoid tax, the affirmative acts of evasion, the
allegation that the attempts were made "willfully and knowingly" and the amount of
the deficiency in tax for each of the years covered by the indictment. See B.ALTn, TAx
.AU-D AND EVASION § 12.3 (3d ed. 1963). Moreover, the Government is not even bound
by these allegations: it need not prove that the defidency even approximated that
alleged. Gendlemen v. United States, 191 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 42 U.S.
909 (1952). See also Himmelfarb v. United States, supra note 207, at 934, 936.
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of the case against him will be in the motion for bill of particulars.
28 4
The bill of particulars is supposed to provide the defendant, when the
indictment does not, sufficient notice to enable him to prepare his de-
fense and to prevent surprise at the trial. 285 But the amount of informa-
tion considered necessary for adequate preparation varies enormously
among trial courts and, however stingy, the lower court's allotment is
virtually never ground for reversal.
280
Allowing for the variations among trial courts, some generalizations
can still be made about what tax fraud defendants may usually discover
through a bill. The Government's theory of proof will usually be di-
vulged, i.e., whether the net worth method, specific items, bank deposits
or some combination of methods will be used.287 If it is the net worth
method, the defendant will want to know the opening and closing net
worth figures for each year, the assets and liabilities included in the
calculations, the starting point in the Government's proofs, the sources
of the unreported income, the expenditures the Government will at-
tempt to prove, and all other intermediate calculations. No court will
apparently give him all of this information. Most probably require the
Government only to reveal its intention to use the net worth method.288
Some grant the opening and closing figures; 280 and a few, a substantial
part of the analysis. 20 In a specific items case, the defendant will want
to know what the items are and will usually get such information.20 1
He cannot expect to get much more, though some courts will let him
have the names, dates, amounts and nature of the payments. 2 2 In a bank
[284.] FE. R. CRim. P. 7(f).
[285.] United States v. Finegan, 189 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
[286.] The matter is "addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court." Wong Tal
v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82 (1927). No conviction has apparently been reversed for
failure to grant a motion for particulars in a tax evasion case in more than 80 years.
Ziegler, Detailed Particulars Are Necessity in Fraud Prosecutions, 16 J. TAXATION 294
(1962).
[287.] United States v. Doyle, supra note 51; United States v. Sermon, 218 F. Supp.
871 (W.D. Mo. 1963); United States v. Kleinman, 19 F.R.D. 423, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
[288.] Blackwell v. United States, supra note 66, at 426; United States v. Finegan,
supra note 285; United States v. Hudson, 176 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
[289.] United States v. Geller, 163 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (including amount
and payees of expenditures); United States v. Brown, 179 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1959)
(same); see also United States v. Eissner, 206 F. Supp. 103 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
[290.] United States v. Hoornbeek, 164 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (beginning and
ending net worth figures for each year; item, date, amount, and payee of each ex-
penditure to be proved; claimed gross income and deductions for each year).
[291.] United States v. Geller, supra note 289; United States v. Lipshitz, 150 F. Supp.
321 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
[292.] United States v. Profad, 124 F. Supp. 141, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (defendant in
specific items case entitled to names and dates, if items not large in number; otherwise
a list of general classes or sources); United States v. Kelly, 10 F.R.D. 191 (W.D. Mo.
1950) (nature, source, and amount of gross income and deductions).
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deposit case, some courts will require no more than revelation of the
theory on the ground that the bank deposit evidence is available to
defendant.29 3
Few, if any, courts will require the Government to disclose in a bill
of particulars the names of witnesses it intends to call or to describe the
nature of the documentary evidence it intends to offer.2' The bill,
therefore, is a discovery device of limited utility in almost any court.
Such utility as it has in revealing the Government's theory of proof,
moreover, is undercut by the liberality with which many courts permit
variances and amendments at trial. -9r Apparently, if the Government
specifies a particular item or items in the return as the basis of its
evasion case, it cannot obtain a conviction solely by proving an entirely
different item which was not revealed in the indictment or the bill. Yet
if it adduces evidence of the falsity of one of the items alleged (or evi-
dence of a net worth increase, if it claimed a net worth increase), it is
apparently free to adduce proof of different, unrelated false entries, not
specified in the bill, as "corroborative" evidence.2 00 The defendant's
main protection against surprise, therefore, seems to be his right to tell
the jury that the Government proved something against him which it
had not alleged.
A court which is willing to permit substantial variances between alle-
gation and proof would seem to have no good reason for refusing a
motion for rather detailed particulars. An analogy to notice pleading in
civil cases may easily be overdrawn. Pleadings are vague and general in
[293.] United States v. Taylor, 148 F. Supp. 77 (WID. Pa. 1956); but see United States
v. Kelly, supra note 292.
[294.] See United States v. Geller, supra note 289.
[295.] See United States v. Woodner, 189 F. Supp. 355 (SMD.N.Y. 1960) (Government
permitted to amend bill to allege some 60% to 70% more unreported income than
stated in the bill); United States v. Bender, 218 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1955) (Government
permitted to amend bill three times, the last time on the day before trial).
[296.] See United States v. Nunan, supra note 11 (Government stated in its bill of
particulars, "no disallowance of deductions or exemptions claimed." Nonetheless, it was
permitted to prove that defendant kept no records of his contributions to charities and
could not identify any of the contributions from memory. The court held it was not
improper to admit this evidence, and to permit the prosecution to comment upon iL);
Harris v. United States, 243 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957) (Govern-
ment alleged in bill that defendant had omitted a $45,000 commission from his
return. Held: Not improper to permit proof that he had taken same deductions against
his personal return that his solely owned corporation took on its return: 'There is no
rule of law that -would have prevented the Government from showing, if it could,
that some of the deductions were of a highly suspicious nature, not in an effort to
increase the deficiency of the tax, but to show ... the defendant's knowledge and thus
his intent as to what he was doing . . .'); United States v. McGulre, 347 F.2d 99 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1955) (specific items case "corroborated" by expenditures
evidence); United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 869 U.S. 828
(1962).
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civil actions because their disclosure functions are substantially taken
over in the civil rules by elaborate deposition and admissions ma-
chinery.297 There are no comparable disclosure devices in a criminal
case. 298
Pre-trial Inspection of Documents
Under Rule 16, as promulgated in 1946, defendant was entitled to
inspect and copy designated documents or tangible objects in the pos-
session of the Government which were "obtained from or belong[ed]
to the defendant or [were] obtained from others by seizure or process,
upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the prepara-
tion of his defense and that the request is reasonable." Most courts
held that the defendant's own statements made to government agents
were not discoverable because the rule extended only to tangible items
in which defendant had a pre-existing proprietary interest.2D0 Moreover,
since books and records obtained from third parties were discoverable
only if the Government had obtained them by seizure or process, dis-
covery by defendant was precluded, when, as was often the case, third
parties turned over their records to the Government voluntarily.G00
Rule 16 was amended by the Supreme Court in February, 1966.01
The revised rule authorizes discovery by defendant of his own "written
or recorded statements" and his own "recorded testimony before a
grand jury."302 Hence, if defendant's statement was recorded verbatim
[297.] See JAMEs, CIVIL PRoCEDnURE 54-99 (1965).
[298.] For an especially enlightened opinion on the subject, see Judge Foley's con-
fession of past error in United States v. Eissner, supra note 289. A judge less willing to
admit he has been wrong may, however, make a graceful about-face in reliance upon
a recent amendment of Rule 7(f). The prior rule said that the "court for cause may
direct the filing of a bill of particulars." In February, 1966, the Supreme Court deleted
"for cause." This amendment, according to the Advisory Committee, was "designed to
encourage a more liberal attitude by the courts toward bills of particulars without taking
away the discretion which courts must have in dealing with such motions in individual
cases." 86 Sup. Ct. 102.
[299.] See, e.g., United States v. Murray, supra note 296; contra, United States v.
Fancher, 195 F. Supp. 488 (D. Conn. 1961) (collecting cases on both sides).
[300.] Thus, it was even held that defendant was not entitled to inspect working
papers and reports of his public accountant which were delivered voluntarily to the
IRS by the accountant. United States v. Brown, supra note 289. See also United States
v. Duncan, 22 F.R.D. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
[301.] 86 Sup. Ct. 184. For a discussion of these rules prior to adoption, together
with earlier drafts, see Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard,
1964 DuxE L.J. 477.
[302.] Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the gov-
ernment to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant
(1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies
thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence
of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the
Vol. 76: 1, 1966
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he will normally be entitled to inspect it. It is not dear, however,
whether the new rule extends to disclosure of an agent's notes or memo-
randa of conversations with the defendant.303 If not, IRS agents can
avoid disclosing their versions of defendant's statements to the defense
prior to trial merely by refraining from recording them verbatim or
asking him to sign them.
Rule 16(b), also new, jettisons the absurd requirement that third
party documents are discoverable only if obtained from them involun-
tarily. The new rule allows discovery of any documents "which are in
the possession, custody, or control of the government upon a showing
of materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the request is
reasonable." 30 -4 The rule expressly excludes from its coverage, however,
"reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by
government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution
of the case, or of the statements made by government witnesses or pro-
spective government witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of
the government except as provided in [the Jencks Act]."' 05 This exclu-
attorney for the government, (2) results or reports of physical or mental examina-
tions, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular
case, or copies thereof . . .and (3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a
grand jury.
FED,. R. Ca n. P. 16(a).
[03.] It seems likely that the draftsmen intended the meaning of the phrase, "written
or recorded statements or confessions of the defendant," in Rule 16(a) to be drawn by
analogy from the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1954), which defines a "statement" as
(1) a written statement made by said witess and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him; or (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording,or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral state-
ment made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contem-
poraneously with the 
making of such oral statement.
Substituting "defendant" for "witness" in § 3500(e), it would follow that an agents notes
of conversations with defendant would e defendant's "statements" if shaown to or readto the defendant, and acquiesced in by him, or if a substantially verbatim account of
defendant's oral remarks. However, if the notes were 
"summaries of an oral statement
which evidence[d] substantial selection of material, or . . . were prepared after theinterview without the aid of [verbatimi notes ... [o] contain 
the agent's interpretations
or impressions," Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 4, 350 (1959), they would not e
statements of the witness within § 3500(e) or of the defendant within Rule 16(a).
One reason why the definition of "statement" in Rule 16(a) sould arguably' be taken
from 18 U.S.C. 500(e, is that notes and memoranda of a Government agent are state-
ments of that agent, whether or not they are also statements of the defendant. C. Clancy
v. United States, 65 U.S. 312 (1961). And if they are statements of the agent and not
of the defendant, their pre-trial inspection is precluded by ,§ 3500(a). C. Palermo v.
United States, supra. It can be urged, however, that an agents notes, if not transmitted
by him to another agent, are not statements by the agent within the meaning of_ the
Jencks Act. C. United States v. Johnson, 37 F.d 180, 202 (4th Cir. 194), afJ' on
other grounds, 86 Sup. Ct. 749 (1966). Thus, the notes might be given no immunity by
the Jencks Act, leaving the meaning of "statement" in Rule 16(a) to be shaped withoutregard to the Act.
[304.] 86 Sup. Ct. 187.
pS05.] Ibid.
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sion exempts most of the items which would really be useful in prepar-
ing the defense.3
0 6
Moreover, in carrying over from the old rule the requirement of "a
showing of materiality to the preparation of his defense" and that "the
request is reasonable" the draftsmen may have given courts an excuse
to deny documentary discovery in all but exceptional cases. Several
courts under the old rule held, for example, that the defendant's own
statements-perhaps the most important single item of evidence in the
typical criminal case-were not "material to the preparation of his
defense."307 Others suggested that demands to see such statements were
not "reasonable."308 Some courts implied that almost any demand, even
for defendant's own records or for records obtained from third parties
by process, was either unreasonable or immaterial, or both.30 9 These
strained and hostile interpretations should have been rejected by re-
phrasing the section.810
Insofar as judicial reluctance to grant discovery has truly been based
[306.] Especially if it includes the agent's memoranda of conversations with the de-
fendant. See note 303 supra and accompanying text.
[307.] See United States v. Steely, 32 F.R.D. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1962); United States v.
Fuentes, 25 F.R.D. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v Acheson, 25 F.R.D. 849 (S.DN.Y,
1960).
[308.] United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States
v. Acheson, supra note 307.
[309.] See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 913 (EMl. Ill. 1962); United
States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Ill. 1960); United States v. Bentvena, supra note
308.
[810.] The most effective doctrinal base upon which a court so inclined could resist
defendant's discovery efforts under the former Rule 16 was the requirement that docu-
ments sought be "designated." The defendant, who, unlike his counterpart on the civil
side of the court, had no deposition or interrogatory procedure to assist him in locating
and learning of the existence of documents, often found this condition insurmount
able. Frequently denied for insufficient designation were motions for "any and all books,
papers, documents or other tangible objects which may have been obtained from
[named defendants]," United States v. Capes, 193 F. Supp. 627 (D. Md. 1961); "all books,
papers, documents and tangible objects, including checks, bills, amounts, books, can-
celled check stubs, bank statements, which belonged to the defendant or were obtained
from any source or any person by seizure or process," United States v. Finegan, supra
note 285; "each and every document upon which the government will rely," United
States v. Grassman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.NJ. 1957).
The same courts who imposed impossible designation requirements on criminal de-
fendants would readily enforce an administrative summons, see, e.g., In re International
Corporation, 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), or a motion for documentary inspection in a
civil case, see 4 Moo, FEDrAL PRAGE 34.07 (2d ed. 1962), cast in equally broad and
general terms, despite the fact that the statute authorizing a summons requires that records
sought be "described with reasonable certainty," I.R.C. § 7603, and that FrD. R. Civ. P. 34
requires the party desiring inspection both to designate the documents and to show "good
cause."
The new Rules delete the designation requirement but it is not clear whether the pur-
pose was to liberalize discovery or whether, as a court might conclude, the requirement
was deleted as superfluous. If the courts continue to impose a heavy burden on the de-
fendant to show that what he seeks is "material to the preparation of his defense" and
that his demands are "reasonable," he will still have to designate with particularity In
order to meet his burden.
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upon the belief that discovery should be mutual, then the new rules
may help soften judicial attitudes. For new Rule 16(c) allows the court
to condition any discovery order in favor of the defendant (other than
an order permitting inspection of his own statements) upon the de-
fendant's permitting the Government to inspect or copy any tangible
evidence, other than investigative reports and statements of witnesses,
in defendant's possession or control which "defendant intends to pro-
duce at the trial," upon a showing by the Government of materiality
and reasonableness.3 1' This procedure, the constitutionality of which
is unclear,312 seems unnecessary in most criminal cases, including tax
prosecutions. The notion that the Government lacked substantial dis-
covery against the defendant was a myth under prior procedure. More-
over, any implication that there is now mutuality and reciprocity in
criminal cases akin to that in civil cases is wrong. Yet this innovation
may result in some additional disclosure for the defendant, though op-
timism seems premature.
In summary, the tax evasion defendant did get to see more documents
in the Government's custody under the old rules and will probably get
more under the new than the average criminal defendant. But he will
get to see very little. Even under the new rules, the defendant will see
and hear virtually all of the prosecution's evidence for the first time at
the trial.
3. Is the jury uniquely reliable in screening out the innocent in tax
evasion prosecutions?
It is frequently asserted by proponents of the status quo that alleged
defects in criminal procedure are illusory because they are counter-
balanced by the requirement that all tvelve jurors be personally per-
suaded of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3 ' It could be urged that
this is especially true in tax evasion prosecutions because the defendant
is frequently articulate and attractive-a person with whom the jurors
can readily identify and sympathize--and because the offense itself is
not generally regarded with abhorrence. Thus, the unanimity and
[311.] 86 Sup. Ct. 187.
[312.] The question, of course, is whether this provision can be squared with the Fifth
Amendment See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962); Note, 76
HAv. L. Rsv. 838 (1963); Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger
Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CAUF. L. REv. 89 (1965); see also statement of Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in part to adoption of Amendments to Rules, 86 Sup. Ct. 208
(1966).
[313.] Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discover,, 33 F.R.D. 74, 75
(1963); United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (opinion of Judge
Learned Hand).
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reasonable doubt requirements may afford even more protection to the
accused than in other criminal cases.
This argument sounds plausible, but, in fact, it does not justify the
procedural hobbling of tax evasion defendants. 1 4 It has no application
to defendants with criminal records, unsavory associates, disreputable
businesses, or even affiliation with unpopular political or social causes.
Such defendants do not get favored treatment in a tax evasion case;
juries frequently pack them away on very thin evidence. 1 5
The typical tax evasion defendant may not be regarded by the
jurors as a "surrogate self." He will often enjoy an income and standard
of living far higher than most jurors. His financial pressures, his temp-
tations, the customs and values of his social milieu, will often be
quite different from those of the clerks and pensioners on the jury.
The common assumption that jurors in tax prosecutions are loathe
to convict suffers from a paucity of evidence. The evidence points the
other way: While the proportion of non-racketeer tax defendants has
increased over the past several years, as has the incidence of prosecutions
for small deficiencies, 316 the number of convictions has steadily in-
creased 317 with no fall-off in rates of conviction. In 1948 the rate was
95%;318 in 1965, 967. 319 Moreover, of the cases actually tried before
[314.] As has earlier been shown, see text accompanying notes 79-141 supra, the
requirement of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not one which the courts seriously
supervise, but a jury instruction only. Not only do courts fail to evaluate the evidence
independently before letting the case go to the jury, they do almost nothing after verdict
to see if their instructions were followed. Quizzing of jurors after the verdict, by court or
counsel, is widely regarded as unethical. See Opinion 109, OPINIo Ns or THE CoMMITrrr= ON
PROFESSIONAL EmIcs AND GRIEVANCES 231 (A.B.A. 1957). The so-called "requirement" of
unanimity is also unenforced. A quotient or majority verdict is a valid verdict, if only for
the reason that a court will not permit anyone to prove the facts. See 6 MoORE, FEDERAL
PRACrCE 59.08[4]. Moreover, the Chicago Jury Studies, confirming common sense on the
matter, have shown that dissenting jurors virtually always give in to the majority anyway,
See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 747-48 (1959).
[315.] See, e.g., Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960), re-o'd on confession
of error, 366 U.S. 716 (1961). It is noteworthy, moreover, that while in most criminal cases
the unsavory character and prior bad acts of the defendant are inadmissible, this Is not
true in tax fraud cases as to prior bad acts which may involve the making of money, In a
net-worth case, the Government is free to prove how the defendant came by his money,
or might have come by it, during any relevant period. Thus, his associations with gamblers,
racketeers, etc., his offers to accept bribes, almost any prior evil act with a mercenary
flavor to it, is admissible against him. See United States v. Keenan, 267 F.2d 118 (7th Cir.
1959).
[316.] See, on the history of tax prosecutions, Schmidt, Current Department of Justice
Criminal Income Tax Policies, 38 TAXEs 293 (1960). See also Lyon, The Crime of Income
Tax Fraud: Its Present Status and Function, 53 COLUM. L. Ray. 476 (1953).
[317.] In the eleven-year period from 1953 to 1964, there were 7035 convictions for tax
fraud. In the preceding twenty-two year period, there were a total of only 2900 convictions.
There were 607 convictions in 1964, compared with 552 in 1962, 492 in 1958. 1964 ATrr'Y
GaN. ANN. RaP. 317.
[318.1 Ibid.
[319.] 1965 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 312.
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juries, (some 89% of tax fraud defendants are convicted on guilty or
nolo pleas)320 the percentage of convictions in recent years has been as
high as the average of all federal criminal cases. In 1964, the percentage
of convictions in all federal criminal trials by jury was 73% 2.3-1 The
percentage in jury trials in criminal tax cases during 1964 was 71%, and
in 1963, 74%.322 The statistics suggest that juries in criminal tax cases
are usually willing to convict. Many jurors may, in fact, feel a strong
urge to exhibit outrage by convicting one who appears to have done
what they too have either done or been tempted to do.32 This pro-
pensity may be fed by the fact that the jurors themselves know that
their tax returns can be inspected by the IRS as easily as the defendant's
was.
3 2 4
Thus, even though jurors may sometimes disregard their own com-
mon sense to acquit a tax fraud defendant, there are many occasions in
which they do not-in which the best the defendant can hope for is a
rational evaluation of the evidence. In these cases, defendant's ability
to expose weaknesses in the prosecution's case and his capacity to ex-
plain will be crucial. The strength which the jury ascribes to the Gov-
ernment's case will depend upon its assumptions about the motives,
opportunities, and abilities of the defendant to contradict or rebut. Yet
for many of the same reasons which make it difficult for jurors to iden-
tify or to sympathize with the accused, the jury is not well equipped to
see all the weaknesses in the Government's case, nor to understand why
an honest taxpayer could not have provided more cogent proof in his
defense. It surely flatters the average jury to suggest that it collectively
understands the bookkeeping practices of the myriad of taxpayers who
can be brought before it; or that it can be relied upon to locate un-
[320.] Of 627 defendants in 1964, 30 were acquitted and 597 convicted, 507 (89%) by
pleas. 1964 ADINtSTRATrVE OFFICE OF UNrrED STATES CouRTS ANN. REP. 256.
[321.1 There were 2671 decisions by juries in federal criminal prosecutions during 1964.
1955 (73%) were convictions; 716 (277) were acquittals. See 1964 AD,,muNTRATnE OFFCE
OF THE UNrr-D STATES CoURTs ANN. REP. 256.
[322.] 1964 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 317. Similar data is not contained in the 1965 report
which lumps together all "cases which went to trial" and which reports a "70%, margin
of success." 1965 Afr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 312.
[323.] Cf. ALEXANDER & STAuu, THE CiatmNAL, THE JUDGE, AND TnE Punuc 218-17 (rev.
ed. 1956).
[324.] In United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937
(1958), the United States attorney had selected his jury with the help of the tax returns
of 150 of the veniremen, choosing, on the basis of the information he gleaned from the
returns, which of the prospective jurors would be most favorable to the Government. The
Court held this practice was lawful. For a recent, rather cryptic statement of Justice
Department policy regarding tax investigations of prospective jurors, see testimony of
Attorney General Katzenbach in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administraitve
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 155, at 1164,
1641.
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erringly those instances in which a taxpayer has merely been careless,
rather than dishonest, in his approach to record keeping; or that its
members whose average annual income may be $6,000 can easily under-
stand how a taxpayer could simply have forgotten to record an income
item of $10,000 or could really have spent $20,000 entertaining cus-
tomers in a single year.
The jury is further hampered in its evaluation of proofs by ignorance
of the pre-trial context. The defendant might have been uncooperative
with the Internal Revenue agents on grounds having little to do with
consciousness of guilt. He might have failed to cooperate on the advice
of a lawyer who, perhaps for quite personal reasons or out of ignorance
of the consequences, advises non-cooperation to his clients as a matter
of course. The taxpayer or his attorney might merely have been obsti-
nate, or have felt oppressed by seemingly unreasonable demands of the
examining agent. And even if the trial judge permits defense counsel
to explain his client's pre-trial conduct fully, including taking the testi-
mony of those who advised the taxpayer, the defense risks bewildering
an already confused jury and inflating a collateral issue if he explores
the pre-trial context in detail.
Virtually always complex, a tax prosecution usually involves account-
ing operations outside the experience of most jurors and accounting
concepts often beyond their comprehension. It hardly follows, however,
that the jury will understand the defendant's inability to comprehend
and cope with the Government's figures or to correct errors and omis-
sions in them.
4. Are trials superfluous?
A final possible justification for the advantages conferred on the Gov-
ernment is the assumption that the administrative selection process is
a substitute for trial safeguards. There is an elaborate hierarchy of ad-
ministrative screens between the taxpayer and the petit jury-a more
intricate screening process, containing more layers, than virtually any-
where else in the criminal process. 25 But it does not follow that the
administrative selection procedure is unlikely to produce an innocent
accused.
Consider first the ability of administrative officials to determine the
facts-that there was a substantial deficiency and that it was "willful."
IRS and Justice Department officials are undeniably expert in evaluat-
[325.] See text accompanying notes 250-53 supra.
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ing evidence, but their ability to utilize their expertise is limited by the
fact that not until trial can the defendant be expected to reveal all the
evidence he has which tends to exculpate him. Frequently, of course,
he will offer palliating evidence or explanations, but often, on the
advice of his attorney, he will save some of his defense for the trial.
Moreover, any explanation will suffer from the guarded vagueness with
which questions are put to the taxpayer by the investigator. Because a
tax investigation is an adversary proceeding, the Government is neither
motivated nor equipped to ferret out evidence which vindicates the
taxpayer. Piling up tiers of reviewing officials does not alter this fact.
The Justice Department purports, however, to make two decisions
before commencing a prosecution: (1) Is the taxpayer guilty? (2) Is he
likely to be convicted? A negative answer to either question, we are
told, results in no prosecution.3201 Yet officials cannot be expected to per-
form these disparate roles with equal vigor. The effectiveness of the
official in both capacities is inevitably reduced when he is required to
search for, solicit, and select evidence with which to convict his ad-
versary at the same time he is deciding if the subject is innocent.
Moreover, even if the administrative hierarchy were animated and
equipped to determine the facts with a high degree of accuracy, it would
not follow that a decision to prosecute was a reliable determination that
a defendant was guilty. For the selection procedure is also a definitional
process. The IRS and Justice Department select as targets people whom
they think ought to and can be punished. Their decision to prosecute
is, therefore, an inseparable blend of fact determination and law appli-
cation.
Administrative officials bent on maximizing revenue are tempted to
tacitly broaden the scope of the sanction by prosecuting persons whose
derelictions are quite common and ordinary and against whom little
proof can be mustered-to convert a civil offense into a criminal one.
While flagrant violators will always have to be included in the mixture
of criminal defendants--lest people learn that the way to evade success-
fully is to do it on a grand scale-the batch, for maximum deterrent
value, should arguably include a sizeable number of persons whose de-
ficiencies are small and in no way unusual.3 - At least IRS officials could
plausibly so conclude. Great deference to the administrative process in
selecting appropriate subjects for the criminal sanction cannot be justi-
[526.] Schmidt, supra note 316, at 295.
[527.] Cf. Long, The Use of Criminal Sanctions for Tax Violations, 19653 TuLA,%E
TAx INST. 389, 594-401.
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fled, therefore, unless we are willing to permit administrators to define
the crime.
It is by no means obvious that administrative officials ought to wield
substantial power to define the offense by applying criteria aimed at
enhancing the revenue potential of the criminal sanctions. Moreover,
even if this proposition were tenable in the abstract, there is no way
to compel officials to employ only criteria relevant to promoting tax
compliance. Every procedural or substantive rule which broadens prose-
cutorial discretion, ostensibly to permit more effective use of expertise
in selecting revenue-raising targets, permits officials to employ criteria
for selecting defendants which are unrelated to the production of reve-
nue. The history of tax prosecutions shows clearly that where this dis-
cretion exists, it will be exercised. A few decades ago, virtually all tax-
payers who were criminally prosecuted were suspected gangsters or
racketeers.32 A few years ago, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
told a congressional committee that the Internal Revenue Service was
cooperating "with the Justice Department and all other law enforce-
ment agencies in rooting out of our society certain undesirables as well
as carrying out our normal tax enforcement program."'320 A sizeable
portion of the defendants currently being prosecuted for tax evasion
still fall into the "racketeer" category, a larger proportion than can be
justified on revenue considerationsa 30 There is, moreover, evidence of
[328.] See Schmidt, supra note 316, at 294.
[329.] Testimony of Commissioner Caplin in Hearings Before the House Committee on
Appropriations Regarding 1962 Appropriations for the Treasury Department, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 471 (1961).
[330.] 32 "rackets figures or corrupt public officials" were indicted and convicted of tax
offenses in 1964. 1964 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 326. In recent testimony before the Long
Committee, the Attorney General stated that "more than 60 per cent of our racketeering
convictions stem from devoted investigative work by intelligence agents of I.R.S." Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comfi.
on the Judiciary, supra note 155, at 1159. It could be argued, of course, that revenue
considerations alone justify some emphasis on taxpayers deriving income from Illegal
activities. The illegality often makes the expenses non-deductible and thus forces the
individuals either to commit tax evasion or to quit their nefarious activities. Furthermore,
since disclosure of illegal income will virtually assure exposure of the illegal conduct, the
temptation to omit such income from a tax return is compelling. Thus, an investigation of
one suspected of unlawful income-producing activities is likely to bear fruit. Moreover, It
may be relatively easy to get convictions and long prison terms in cases involving reputed
racketeers or hooligans. Such prosecutions get good news coverage and strengthen the
statistics on conviction rates and sentences. Militating heavily against emphasis on such
persons as targets, however, are at least two factors: (1) A rank-and-file taxpayer is unlikely
to perceive the conviction of a gambler or hoodlum as being very relevant to himself-
such prosecutions may even suggest to him that he need not fear the criminal sanction,
(2) in the minds of many citizens, the use of criminal tax sanctions is an unfair method
of convicting people for other crimes-those who feel this way may consciously or
unconsciously reflect their disapproval in their own tax returns and in their other dealings
with the Government.
Vol. 76: 1, 1966
HeinOnline -- 76 Yale L.J. 74 1966-1967
Income Tax Prosecutions
current efforts to convict "corrupt public officials"' 1 and political
deviates3 2 of tax evasion.
The fact is that the income tax sanctions have proven enormously
effective in putting into prison individuals who are suspected of other
illegal or immoral activities for which they cannot be convicted. It is
clear that many people in the future, as in the past, will be selected for
tax prosecution not because they are the best examples for promoting
tax compliance but because the officials believe such persons can be
convicted and feel that they ought to be. The reasons may be as varied
as the values of those who make the decisions.
IV. Conclusion
Administrative discretion pervades the tax prosecution from com-
mencement of the audit to appellate review. The values behind defer-
ence to the administrator in civil cases are well served in criminal tax
prosecutions. At every step in the process, basic safeguards and Fifth
Amendment rights are subtly sliced away beneath a cloak of conceptual-
ism. The Government is permitted, with its audit procedures and its
administrative summons, to gather information from the taxpayer
which may be used to convict him of crime. Right up to indictment, its
civil-criminal investigation is treated as purely civil. Yet when the tax-
payer who is a potential criminal defendant seeks civil discovery in a
civil case, discovery is denied because he may use the information in
defending the criminal charge. Thus, whether the civil or criminal
aspects of the ambiguous pre-trial process predominate depends on
which characterization disadvantages the taxpayer. Moreover, if the
prosecution at the trial meets what is no more than a civil burden of
proof, the taxpayer must establish his innocence. Yet he is denied the
means of doing so which he would have if he were truly involved in a
civil case. He is not granted significantly more pre-trial disclosure than
other criminal defendants.
If increased recognition of criminal safeguards seriously threatened
to curtail tax compliance, the burden might be heavy on one who urges
even-handed treatment of tax and other criminal defendants. But there
[331.] See 1964 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 326, 328-29.
[32.] See Lenske v. United States, 18 AFTR 2d 5813 (9th Cir. 1966), where the court
reversed what it characterized as a "witch hunt." The court considered, improperly
according to the dissent, the special agent's report, which stated that the defendant was a
suspected Communist and that he and another lawyer had formed a local chapter of the
Lawyer's Guild. The report also contained newspaper clippings which revealed the
ominous fact that the taxpayer had expressed opposition to this country's activities in
Cuba, Laos and China. The grounds of reversal were multifarious.
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is neither evidence nor plausible argument that this is so. Since not one
audit in a thousand results in criminal prosecution, revenue agents
could be required to adequately warn a taxpayer and to refrain from
using the summons to gain evidence for a criminal case without affect-
ing any but a fraction of the confrontations between agent and taxpayer.
The investigative process could continue virtually as before, yet tax-
payers would not be convicted of crime on evidence obtained from them
involuntarily. There is, moreover, no cause to believe that tightening
the Government's burden of proof in the criminal case, and liberalizing
pre-trial disclosure, would signally interfere with normal tax adminis-
tration. It would merely make it more costly to convict the guilty and
more difficult to convict the innocent. The price seems right.
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